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KRONMILLER, THEODORE G., THE LAWFULNESS OF DEEP SEABED MINING (Fore-
word by Congressmen Murphy and Breaux), I and II, Vol I, pp. xix and 521, Vol.
II, pp. 46 and iii. (both vols.) (Oceana Publications, New York, 1980) [hereinafter
cited as KRONMILLER]
BARKENBUS, JACK N., DEEP SEABED RESOURCES: POLITICS AND TECHNOLOGY, pp.
xiv and 191 (The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., New
York, 1979) [hereinafter cited as BARKENBUS]
LUARD, EVAN, THE CONTROL OF THE SEA-BED: A NEW INTERNATIONAL ISSUE, pp.
309 and x (Heinemann, London, 1974) [hereinafter cited as LUARD]
ALLEN, SCOTT, and CRAVEN, JOHN P., ALTERNATIVES IN DEEPSEA MINING, p. Viii
and 110 (Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, Sea Grant Cooperative
Report UNIHI-SEAGRANT-CR-79-03, 1979) [hereinafter cited as ALLEN &
CRAVEN]
KILDOW, JUDITH T., DEEPSEA MINING, pp. x and 251 (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
1980) [hereinafter cited as KILDOW]
FRIEDHEIM, ROBERT L., MANAGING OCEAN RESOURCES: A PRIMER, pp. xii and
208 (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1979) [hereinafter cited as FRIEDHEIM].
I. The Issue of "Constitutionality" in
Public International Law
One of the important debates, today, raising fundamental issues regard-
ing the formulation of international law, and of what may be called "consti-
tutionality" as a value in the relation of that law and those values to the
community of nations and the society of man, has tended to focus upon
deep seabed mining. This topic has become an important bone of conten-
tion, not so much, apparently, on account of any perceptions of its immedi-
ate intrinsic economic significance for the world's supply of industrially
*Part II will appear in the summer issue of The International Lawyer.
tProfessor of Law, Director, International Legal Studies Program, Syracuse University Col-
lege of Law.
294 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
essential resources, as on account of its symbolic character. Its symbolism
lies, of course, in its consecration as a key issue in the controversy over the
New International Economic Order and in the confrontation between
"North" and "South" regarding the redistribution of wealth and power-
the stated object of that New Order.
In the international arena, pseudoprescriptive exercises which lack
appropriate communication, interaction, shared values and expectations
impose excessive stresses on the mutual tolerances which exist at any given
time to control community expectations of acceptable, or at least supporta-
ble, behavior in the community of states. When these mutual tolerances are
exceeded, purported constitutive prescriptions fail to convince or to be cred-
ible. Furthermore, pressures to impose such prescriptions without estab-
lishing the essentials of common goals and values, mutual consent and
shared perspectives and purposes, burden the international community and
its law-making processes with stresses on its acceptability. This bodes ill for
the effective future of other and, possibly, more valid developments. The
need for the shared values, perspectives, purposes, and basic prescriptions
in a legal order calls for that degree of common ground and predictability
which the term "constitutionality" may validly denote in the international
setting. I
While the current law of resource winning in the commons of mankind is
admittedly antiquated, it still has a claim on the necessary morality of obe-
dience to law and should only be changed by what has just been stipulated
to connote valid constitutional processes. Today there is widespread
acceptance of an important prudential value of international law that sover-
eign states are, given the current turbulence of their relations, the bulwarks
of their peoples' freedoms. In such an armed and violent world, freedom of
a people's consent to new obligations which a political mood of the major-
ity, or of the powerful, might otherwise cast upon it becomes a fundamental
protection of the unarmed and underarmed. Impositions, furthermore, can
only create the expectation of further violations of independence and secur-
ity in the future, of possibly ever-increasing severity. Counsel, therefore, is
offered against impatience. It is hoped that the development of knowledge,
and especially of scientific knowledge, will not be stultified by suspicion. It
is further hoped that its results will be widely shared, and that human dig-
nity and welfare will become the watchword of regimes which could be
created to share and enjoy the fruits of discoveries. While constitutionality
and due process are important values which seem to have been lost sight of
in the seabed mining debate, it also needs to be noted that at a more mun-
dane level of prudential politics, many of the developed, industrialized
'For an exposition of the theory of a world constitutive process influencing the foregoing
statements, see Remarks of Myers McDougal, 64 PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 56 57 (1970). For a
thorough treatment of the topic see McDougal, Laswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive
Process of Authoritatiye Decision, I THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 70
(Black & Falk eds. 1969).
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countries of the West have viewed it as lacking the immediacy and saliency
of many other matters being negotiated at the Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea. Thus, for example, Ambassador Aldrich has
told us:
There is no question (in my mind) that thirty or fifty years from today the world,
more specifically the industrialized world, will be heavily dependent upon miner-
als from the seabeds. Particular dependence will be on nickel, cobalt and manga-
nese. The seabeds will always be a moderate or small producer in the world's
copper supply. But, at that time, the industrialized countries will sorely need
those resources. Today the need is not great. Part of the problem we face in
arguing in the abstract the legal questions of states rights to mine manganese
nodules, despite the opinion of the majority of voting members in the United
Nations General Assembly, is that we lose focus of reality. That is, do we really
need manganese nodules to supply our mineral needs? For example, if instead of
manganese nodules we were talking about petroleum, I do not think we would be
arguing the issue. Certainly, we would not be negotiating in a United Nations
Conference about the subject. 2
But this appraisal tends to underestimate the relevance, for future devel-
opments, both in Ocean Law and the Law of Outer Space, of the concepts
being so hotly advocated and defensively contested at the present time in
Committee I (Deep Seabed Mining) of the Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea. For now the subjects of these negotiations are
providing models for projected regimes to govern the resources of the Moon
and Outer Space-for example, capturable meteorites and moon minerals.3
And here it may be well to note that the prospective feasibility and future
benefits of mining the minerals to be found in Outer Space are not far-
fetched imaginings. Indeed, mining these resources should be viewed,
today, as no more outlandish than deep seabed mining appeared to be
when Dr. John Mero wrote in one of his early pioneering books4 (in 1965)
of the availability, as a source of needed resources, of manganese nodules
and of the impending practicability of mining them.5 Today, for example,
Professor O'Neill can persuasively write, in terms of a contemporary tech-
nology for mining on the Moon that:
In space our first mines will almost surely be on the Moon. Particularly on the
lunar Farside, enormous quantities of materials could be removed without ill
effects of any kind. It comes as a surprise to most people to learn how rich a
2Panel Comment on Goldie, Customary International Law and Deep Seabed Mining, Sympo-
sium, Mining the Deep Seabed A Range of Perspectives, 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 173 at
197 (1979).
'For a demonstration of the "Precedential Effects of the Deep Seabed Regime" for the pro-
posed international arrangements regarding the winning of minerals and fuels in Outer Space,
see American Branch of the International Law Association, Report of the Committee on the
Law of the Sea (June 1980), PROCEEDINGS AND COMMITTEE REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN
BRANCH OF THE INT'L L. A., 1979-1980 at 88, 126-28 (1980).
4MERO, THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE SEA (ELSEVIER OCEANOGRAPHY SERIES #1)




source of industrial materials the Moon is: I believe that in the long run the
Apollo Project, much criticized as it was during its lifetime, will be seen to have
been of enormous value for its lunar prospecting function.
6
And:
In order to rid ourselves of what Isaac Asimov calls our "planetary chauvinism"
we should consider why the Moon, though it is necessary as a materials source, is
less suitable than L5 as a site for industry and human habitation.
7
It is possibly not surprising, since the United States appears to be develop-
ing a mining technology for materials and minerals in and on the Moon,
and, possibly, for the capture of meteorites and their fuels, materials and
minerals, in addition to its technology of deep seabed mining. Possibly it is
thus not a coincidence that a potentially preclusive doctrine stemming from
one interpretation of the popular slogan "the common heritage of man-
kind" (which has been the focus of a great deal of the debate at the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea) should have been
extended to the draft United Nations Agreement Governing the Activities
of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1979.8 In noting these
parallel developments in negotiating a "new" Law of Outer Space with that
advocated at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
one may observe that Article XI of the Moon Treaty provides, in part:
1. The moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind,
which finds its expression in the provisions of this Agreement and in particular, in
paragraph 5 of this article.
2. The moon is not subject to national appropriation by any claim of sovereignty,
by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.
3. Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part thereof or
natural resources in place, shall become property of any State, international inter-
governmental or nongovernmental organization, national organization or non-
governmental entity or of any natural person. The placement of personnel, space
vehicles, equipment facilities, stations and installations on or below the surface of
the moon, including structures connected with their surface or subsurface, shall
not create a right of ownership over the surface or the subsurface of the moon or
any areas thereof....
5. States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to establish an international
regime, including appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natu-
ral resources of the moon as such exploitation is about to become feasible. This
provision shall be implemented in accordance with Article XVIII of this Agree-
ment.
When paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 are read together, this Article may, arguably,
be seen to provide, in current law of the sea language, and in addition to
6O'NEILL, THE HIGH FRONTIER 58 (Bantam paperback 1978).
'Id. at 137. See also id. at 148-49. In particular O'Neill's remarks concerning the quantities
of titanium and oxygen, inter alia, "locked into [the Moon's] soils and rocks and waiting to be
used", at 59, should be noted. See also id. at 108, 136, 315-16.
8U.N.G.A. Res. 34/68, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 46 at 77, U.N. Doc. A/34/Supp. 46
(1980).
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paragraph l's enunciation of the "Common Heritage" principle, for a mor-
atorium principle.
An insensitive scanning of some of the reviews which follow may tend to
provoke a reflex comment that they have been written from an Adam Smith
point of view (" 'every man for himself and the Devil take the hindmost,'
said the Elephant as he danced among the chickens") or a Lotus Case9
theory of international law ("what is not specifically prohibited is permit-
ted"). Such a reaction would both misinterpret the basic conflict in the Law
of the Sea negotiations and misunderstand this reviewer's concern.
With regard to the former, a common and perhaps too facile premise for
expositions on the politics of deep seabed mining issues is that a basic con-
troversy in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
arises from the direct confrontation of selfish mining interests against inter-
national distributive justice. By contrast, this reviewer's observation is that
the challenges which have so complicated that conference have arisen from
the pitting of opposing blueprints of economic development, theories of
legal order, and political ideologies. Thus, a confrontation certainly exists.
But it is a collision about fundamentals, not superficial matters, nor of sim-
ple possessive greed. This more basic antithesis reflects this reviewer's con-
cern. It demands a greater solicitude, than has been witnessed to date, for
international fairness, validity, notice and what we may call "constitution-
ality," in the sense of due process, limitations on the excessive use of power
and restraints on the abuse of rights. Currently, in international fora it is
often possible to find valid and fundamentally important claims to self-
determination, human dignity and welfare becoming interwoven with, and
diverted by, a hue and cry after fabled villains and other chimera. The first
of the books under review is Kronmiller's two volumes.' 0
II. Point: Counterpoint
A swelling chorus of voices intoning the theme that ocean mining is
unlawful seems increasingly to be upwelling around the mining industry of
the United States. We may randomly select four such voices (or groups of
voices) from the -multitude whose burden is the same. They may appear to
read from different scores, but they render their notes in unison on this
particular point. Following are some selections from the choir negating the
claims of free opportunity:
'[1927] P.C.I.J. Series A. No. 10, 2 HUDSON WORLD COURT REPORTS 20 (1935).
'"The first volume of Kronmiller's book consists of text, the second of tables of cases and
treaties, a selected bibliography, a collection of documents and materials, and an index to
volume I. The second volume is, in effect, largely an appendix to the first. In the sections
which follow immediately and which largely concentrate on Kronmiller's work, citations to
that author's first volume, which contains his arguments and thesis, will be by reference to
page numbers only; reference to the second volume will show both volume and page number
only.
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1. Ambassador T T B. Koh, Permanent Representative of the Republic
of Singapore to the United Nations:
I am prepared to concede the point that if such unilateral national legislation
were enacted before 1970, it would be perfectly reasonable to argue that such
legislation is consistent with existing international law, specifically, with the doc-
trine of high seas freedom. . ..
I must point out in this connection that the United States has always stood for
the application of international law in relations between and amongst states. This
is, for example, the position you have taken concerning the seizure of the U.S.
Embassy and its diplomatic personnel in Iran. The United States would weaken
its moral authority if it were to act in a manner which is perceived by the over-
whelming majority of the international community as contrary to international
law. This would be the case if the United States were to enact unilateral national
legislation authorizing seabed mining. 12
2. The Group of Legal Experts on the Question of Unilateral Legislation:13
The principles of law laid down in resolution 2749 (XXV) form the basis of any
international regime applicable to the Area and its resources ...
Consequently, any unilateral act or mini-treaty is unlawful in that it violates
these principles, for the legal regime, whether provisional or definitive, can only
be established with the consent of the international community as the sole repre-
sentative of mankind and in conformity with the system determined by the inter-
national community.
It should be stressed that no investor would have any legal guarantee for his
investments in such activities, for he would likewise be subject to individual or
collective action by the other States in defense of the common heritage of man-
kind, and no purported diplomatic protection would carry any legal weight what-
soever. 14
"Letter addressed to Congressman Bingham dated 20 November 1979, ref:800:612/5 at 1,
copy held in this review's files. This letter was written with the object of expressing opposition
to the enactment of deep seabed mining legislation by the Congress of the United States.
"Id. at 2.
'"This group consisted of:
Chairman: Dr. Roberto Herrera Caceres (Honduras), Ambassador to Belgium, the Nether-
lands and the EEC.
Members: Professor Madjid Bencheickh (Algeria), Professor of Law; Professor Mohamed
Bennouna (Morocco), Dean of the Faculty of Law, Rabat; Dr. Jorge Castanneda (Mexico),
Ambassador, Member of the International Law Commission; Dr. S. P. Jagota (India), Ambas-
sador, Under-Secretary and Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Member of the
International Law Commission; Dr. Julio Cesar Lupinacci (Uruguay), Under-Secretary, Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Biram Ndiaye (Senegal), Professor of Law, University of Dakar;
Dr. Frank X. Njenga (Kenya), Under-Secretary, Member of the International Law Commis-
sion; Mr. C. Pinto (Sri Lanka), Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, member of
the International Law Commission; Mr. K. Rattray (Jamaica), Ambassador, Solicitor General,
Attorney-General's Chambers; Dr. S. Sucharitkul (Thailand), Director General, Treaty and
Legal Departments, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, member of the International Law Commis-
sion; Dr. Yasseen (United Arab Emirates), Counsellor, Permanent Mission at Geneva.
"Letter dated 23 April 1979 from the Goup of Legal Experts (see, supra, note 13) on the
Question of Unilateral Legislation addressed to the chairman of the Group of 77 annexed to
the letter dated 24 April 1979 from the chairman of the Group of 77 addressed to the chairman
of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva, eighth session, 19
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3. Some Soviet-Bloc Spokesmen:
a. Ambassador Goerner (German Democratic Republic):
The adoption of such measures [i.e., unilateral measures to exploit deep seabed
mining resources] could not be justified by invoking the principle of the freedom
of the high seas and would run counter to international law.1
5
b. Ambassador Wiek (Poland):
They [i.e., the unilateral measures referred to in (a) above] would run counter to
the principle of the common heritage of mankind, the principle of international
co-operation, and the Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and
Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction
• . . and would have no legal basis ... 16
c. Ambassador Kozyrev (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics):
States and persons, physical or judicial, were bound to refrain from activities of
exploitation of the resources of the area of the sea-bed and ocean floor, and the
subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. . . . All the foregoing
made it clear that initiatives such as those contemplated by certain countries were
unacceptable and contrary to prevailing moral and political, if not legal, norms in
the field under consideration.
17
4. Ambassador J. Alan Beesley, Q. C., (Canada) in the debate, on Mon-
day, July 28, 1980 on the United States of America's enactment of the Deep
Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act 18 at the Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea, Ninth Resumed Session:
I wish to make quite clear what our position is, Mr. President. We regret this
legislation. We deplore it. We consider it unnecessary, undesirable, unjustifiable
and untimely. We consider it contrary to the concept of the common heritage of
mankind, a concept quite possibly the greatest of any principle or ideal which will
emerge from this Conference. We consider that it violates the fundamental prin-
ciple, of which my Delegation had a large part in the establishment, to which the
Conference is dedicated, namely the principle of consensus. We do not accept the
validity of the arguments advanced in support of such legislation. We do not
understand the rationale for the legislation, coming as it does so close to the end
of this Conference, and we say this with the greatest of understanding for the
country which has passed this legislation. We share the deep concern expressed
March to 27 April 1979 at 6, UN Doc. A/CONF./ 62/77, (mimeo) (25 April 1979), 9
UNCLOS Ill O.R. 8th Sess., Geneva 19 March - 27 April 1979 at 80 (Sales No. E. 80. V. 6.
1980). [hereinafter referred to as Manifesto]. See also Asian-African Legal Consultative Com-
mittee, Study on the Revised Single Negotiating Texts, 17th Sess. (Kuala Lumpur 1976), where
the following statement received agreement:
The only way which this concept [i:e., the status of the hard mineral resources of the deep
ocean floor beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any state as "the common heritage of man-
kind"] can be translated into practice would be to treat the resources of the area as being
under the joint undivided ownership of all nations .... If this is so, then the activities in
the area have necessarily to be under [the] effective control of the international authority
acting on behalf of the entire international community and activities by individual States or
their nationals cannot be permitted except when doing so on behalf of the authority.
"Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Summary Record of the 109th




1830 U.S.C. 1401, 94 Stat. 553 (1980).
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by speakers representing the vast majority of humanity, certainly the vast major-
ity of delegations represented at this Conference. We find particularly disturbing
the provision referred to by the Distinguished Representative of India, including
for example provisions 118, 201, 202 and 203. What we find particularly objec-
tionable is that the Conference appears to be being told what to do on certain
questions such as protection of investments. Surely there is a better approach and
it's the one that the USA delegation above all has always followed-the attempt
to negotiate in good faith to achieve equitable compromises.
Well, we are all here to negotiate in good faith and not on the basis of a dictat
of a pre-judgment of the results specifically designed to override the outcome of
our deliberations if they don't happen to agree with the preconditions laid
down. 19
In counterpoint to this chorus of denial, Kronmiller seems almost a lone
voice. The burden of his refrain is not only that seabed mining, even when
conducted by free enterprise, is lawful, but that actions taken against min-
ing vessels on the high seas, no matter what the pretext might be, would
themselves be unlawful and an outrage of the lawful freedom of others to
use the seas for their legitimate occasions. His conclusion is:
Thus, under international law, it is permissible for a State or private enterprise
unilaterally to appropriate the resources of the seabed and subsoil beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction. Deep seabed mining is clearly within the principle
of the freedom of the seas and is consistent with rules of customary international
law and relevant conventional law. All States are under a duty to respect the
lawful exercise of the freedom to explore and exploit the resources of the deep
seabed and subsoil.
To this it should be added that, in international law, there is no reason why this
activity may not be supported by domestic legislation which does not purport to
claim sovereignty or sovereign rights over, or ownership of, areas of the deep
seabed and subsoil or otherwise to exclude nationals of nonconsenting States.
2
In reaching this conclusion Kronmiller first adumbrates the political and
economic issues of deep seabed mining which underpinned the later chap-
ters in his book. He then takes up the foundation questions regarding the
juridical status of the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of national juris-
diction-the time-honored discussions in terms of: (i) characterizing the
seabed as res communis or res nullius; and (ii) whether the seabed and sub-
soil of the deep ocean floor is subject to a different regime from that of the
water and air column above. Disposing of these preliminary issues, he then
turns the reader's attention to the core issues beginning with the status, in
public international law, of the United Nations General Assembly's Deep
Seabed Mining Moratorium Resolution2 1 of 15 December 1969, and of the
"common heritage of mankind" clause of Article 1 of the General Assem-
'Statement in Plenary Debate on USA Unilateral Seabed Mining Legislation, Monday,
July 28, 1980, at 1-2 (verbatim record taken from official LOS conference tape, mimeo).
2OP. 521.
2 G.A. Res. 2574D(XXIV) 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 30 at 11, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as the Moratorium Resolution]. The operative part of this Resolution states
that the General Assembly of the United Nations:
Declares that, pending the establishment of the aforementioned international regime:
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bly's Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and Subsoil Thereof,
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction of 17 December 1970.22 Having
concluded that deep seabed mining fell under the regime of the high seas he
then discriminatingly reviews its lawfulness in terms of that regime.
Before turning to the more specific review of Kronmiller's book, a final
preliminary point should be stressed. The present debate on the lawfulness
of deep seabed mining requires answers to two questions. These are not
parallel, but sequential. The first relates to the right to take and appropriate
manganese nodules. That is, can a miner acquire a marketable title to the
nodules he has actually brought up from the deep seabed and placed under
his hand? Then, even if this right has been established in his favor, may he,
as a technological and economic prerequisite of his exercise of his right of
capturing the nodules, establish an exclusive mining right to an equitably
sized tract? At this point an important distinction must be drawn. Many
critics of the American legislation and of the Notice of Claim filed by Deep
Sea Ventures with the Department of State,2 3 assert that the claim to mine
exclusively an equitable tract is an assertion of territoriality. It is not. It is a
usufructuary claim, a claim analogous to that of a profit & prendre in the
Anglo-American common law. Thus, this reviewer and his colleagues
advising Deep Sea Ventures stressed, in the Notice of Claim that:
Deepsea [Ventures, Inc.] asserts the exclusive rights to develop, evaluate, and
mine the Deposit and to take, use, and sell all of the manganese nodules in, and
the minerals and metals derived, therefrom. It is proceeding with appropriate
(a) States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound to refrain from all activities of
exploitation of the resources of the area of the sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;
(b) No claim to any part of that area or its resources shall be recognized.
22G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 28 at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as the Declaration of Principles]. That article stated:
The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion (hereinafter referred to as the area), as well as the resources of the area, are the common
heritage of mankind.
"Notice of Discovery and Claim of Exclusive Rights, and request for Diplomatic Protection
and Protection of Investment, by Deepsea Ventures Inc., dated November 14, 1974. This doc-
ument, which was addressed to Hon. Henry A. Kissinger, then the United States Secretary of
State, stated, inter alia that:
Deepsea has been advised by Counsel, whose names appear at the end hereof, that it has
validly established the exclusive rights asserted in this Claim under existing international
law as evidenced by the practice of States, the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, and
general rules of law recognized by civilized nations.
Deepsea asserts the exclusive rights to develop, evaluate and mine the Deposit and to
take, use and sell all of the manganese nodules in, and the minerals and metals derived
therefrom. It is proceeding with appropriate diligence to do so, and requests and requires
States, persons and all other commercial or .political entities to respect the exclusive rights
asserted herein. Deepsea does not assert, or ask the United States of America to assert, a
territorial claim to the seabed or subsoil underlying the Deposit. Use of the overlying water
column, as a freedom of the high seas, will be made to the extent necessary to recover and
transport the manganese nodules of the Deposit.
14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 53 (filed Nov. 15, 1974) (175); See also Goldie, Mining Rights
and the General International Law Regime of the Deep Ocean Floor, 2 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
21, at 49 (1975).
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diligence to do so, and requests and requires States, persons, and all other com-
mercial or political entities to respect the exclusive rights asserted herein. Deep-
sea [Ventures, Inc.] does not assert, or ask the United States of America to assert,
a territorial claim to the seabed or subsoil underlying the Deposit.
24
Without the protection of that exclusive mining right the investment
remains unattractive. The threat of the "free rider" would effectively
inhibit, if not completely preclude, confident investment in deep ocean min-
ing. If the discovering miner were denied the protection of an exclusive
right to mine an equitably sized tract, the free rider could lawfully take
advantage of the miner's discovery and, without contributing to the very
large investment involved therein, begin harvesting the resource. This sec-
ond issue raises far more complex and challenging questions than does the
first, as the press release of the Department of State which, while not consti-
tuting a formal reply to the Deep Sea Ventures' Notice of Claim, was
intended to be responsive to it. That release stated, in part:
The position of the United States Government on deep ocean mining pending the
outcome of the Law of the Sea Conference is that the mining of the seabed
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction may proceed as a freedom of the high
seas under existing international law. If necessary, the Department of State will
consider providing such diplomatic protection for deep seabed mining as would
be provided for other high seas uses. However, high seas freedoms do not include
exclusive rights to the exploration or exploitation of the natural resources of the
area.
25
This statement indicates that the Department of State, while recognizing
the customary international law title of a deep sea miner over the nodules
captured by him and actually brought into his gathering-mining system,
does not recognize any customary international law-conferred authority
enabling it to protect a United States deep seabed miner from the inroads of
foreign free riders who work the same seabed mining area, or "tract," and
gather a harvest which the discoverer might rightfully regard as his own.
III. The Main Topics Discussed
A. Political Developments and the
Economic Context
In the context of this opening chapter Kronmiller pointed to the signifi-
cance of manganese nodules which "could satisfy the global demand for
2414 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 50 at 53.
2 5 ROVINE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1974 at 342-43
(1975). This press release had been preceded by a "press guidance" which stated, in part, that:
The Department of State does not grant or recognize exclusive mining rights to the mineral
resources of an area of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Document accompanying letter dated November 21, 1974 to Mr. John Flipse, President, Deep
Sea Ventures, Inc., from Bernard H. Oxman, Assistant Legal Adviser for Oceans, Environ-
ment and Scientific Affairs, Department of State (Dep't of State File L/OES).
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certain metals for hundreds of years." 26 These metals include nickel,
cobalt, manganese and copper. All of them are of increasing importance
for high technology needs and their land-based production may be subject
to political and economic instability or blackmail, or both simultaneously.
As the United States deep seabed mining industry has fashioned a technol-
ogy to win, at economically feasible costs, these resources, so, as Kronmiller
argues, a number of developing nations are seeking to increase their stake
in the potential benefits from these technological and organizational
advances. In themselves Kronmiller finds such claims not unjustified. His
objections are to the ideological prescriptions which are asserted and which
have the goal of operating preclusively on the United States mining enter-
prises. Briefly such states' arguments are that international law had been
changed as a result of the Moratorium 27 and Declaration of Principles 28
Resolutions and through its continuing its evolution toward the "New
International Economic Order" 2 9-the stated objective of which is "the
transference of wealth and power to the countries of the developing
world."'30 A result of this change has been to have effectively invalidated
the underlying property and contractual institutions, doctrines, rules and
concepts upon which private deep seabed mining enterprises base the legal-
ity, probably effectiveness and validity of their predictions, engagements,
actions and transactions. In this context, Article 29 of the United Nations
Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States should be noted. It
summarizes the attitude of the Group of 7731 toward the hard mineral
21P. 13. at 14, Kronmiller summarized the results of a number of surveys in the following
terms:
Based upon projections from general surveys, it appears that the Pacific Ocean contains
approximately 1.5 trillion tons of manganese nodules at the present time, to which 10 mil-
lion tons are added each year by chemical and biological processes.
"G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 28 at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970), 10 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 220 (1971).2 8G.A. Res. 2574D, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 30 at 11, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969), 9 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 419 at 422 (1970).
2 See, e.g., United Nations Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res.
3281 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 31 at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). See also (I)
International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade,
G.A. Res. 2626 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 28 at 39, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); (2)
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-
VI), S-6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. I at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974); (3) Programme of Action on
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3202 (S-VI), S-6 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. I at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974); (4) Development and International Eco-
nomic Co-operation, G.A. Res. 3362 (S-VII), S-7 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. I at 3, U.N. Doc. A/
10301 (1975); Preparation for an International Development Strategy for the Third United
Nations Development Decade, GA Res. 33/193 (XXXIII), 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 45 at
121, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1979). See also G.A. Res. 32/174 (XXXII), 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
No. 45 at 107, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977).
3
°See, e.g., MEAGHER, AN INTERNATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND POWER: A
STUDY OF THE CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATESpassim (1979), and
the documents therein cited and presented.
"This is the name standardly given to the caucus of developing countries operating on bases
of what they perceive to be their common interest in voting in the various institutions of the
United Nations family. The designation itself would now appear to be a rather quaint anach-
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resources of the deep ocean floor, and toward deep seabed mining by the
American mining industry and its partners, in the following terms:
The sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction, as well as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of man-
kind. On the basis of the principles adopted by the General Assembly in resolu-
tion 2749.(XXV) of 17 December 1970, all States shall ensure that the exploration
of the area and exploitation of its resources are carried out exclusively for peace-
ful purposes and that the benefits derived therefrom are shared equitably by all
States, taking into account the particular interests and needs of developing coun-
tries; an international regime applying to the area and its resources and including
appropriate international machinery to give effect to its provisions shall be estab-
lished by an international treaty of a universal character, generally agreed
upon. 32
This thesis has been reflected in an intervention, as a panelist, by Mr.
Roy Lee as a spokesman for the developing countries at a Symposium held
on "Mining the Deep Seabed: A Range of Perspectives. ' ' 33 He said,
regarding the 1970 General Assembly Declaration of Principles Governing
the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits
of National Jurisdiction: 34
This declaration was unanimously adopted with only fourteen Eastern European
countries abstaining. The United States and all other industrial countries voted
for the declaration. Since 1970, the Eastern European countries have reversed
their position and now endorse the declaration. This is clearly manifested in their
last statement at the seventh resumed session of the Law of the Sea Conference.
At that session, the chairman of the Group of Seventy-Seven made a statement
proclaiming the illegality of any unilateral legislation action for seabed mining,
and, subsequent to his statement, supporting statements were made by China,
Russia, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Sweden, Norway, Finland,
the Netherlands, New Zealand and Australia. It can therefore be seen that since
1970, there has been a universal [sic] consensus on the legal position of the seabed
regime as indicated by the voting in the most representative organ of the interna-
tional community. 35
B. The Juridical Status of the Seabed
The significance of determining whether, under traditional rules, of inter-
national law, the status of the bed of the ocean as either res communis or res
nullius lies in the different doctrines governing acquisition. Title to a res
communis can only be gained by acquisitive prescription-possession
adverse to the world community. On the other hand a res nullius can be
appropriated by a possessing act-the bringing of the res under the hand,
ronism, since the number of caucus members has swollen from the original 77 to over 121 (at
this reviewer's last count). The number is still growing.32See, supra, note 29.
116 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 173 (1979).
3 See. supra, note 22.31Panel Comment on Goldie, Customary International Law and Deep Seabed Mining, Sym-
posium, Mining the Deep Seabed A Range of Perspective, 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 194
(1979) (footnotes omitted).
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the control, of the possessor who, at the same time, evinces intention and
will to exercise that possession. While international tribunals have taken a
benign view of instances of occupation, 36 the establishment of rights against
the world community has usually been veiwed as demanding a far more
rigorous proof. Thus, for example, it has, at least in past centuries, been
easier to establish title to uninhabited and unclaimed tracts of territory (e.g.,
Eastern Greenland or Clipperton Island) than to prove the acquisition of a
historic bay.37
The debate on the status of the seabed beyond the limits of state jurisdic-
tion has been premised on the view that while the high seas themselves are
res communis the subsoil of those seas is res nulius, since it has always been
the object of occupation by means of galleries and extending seaward from
the shore. 38 The issue, then, becomes a matter of settling the status of the
seabed as partaking of either the high seas (and is, accordingly, res com-
munis) or subsoil of the oceans (and so res nullius and capable of ownership
by right of capture merely).
A former distinguished representative of the international lawyers who
argue that the seabed, as distinct from its subsoil, should be seen as assimi-
lated to the regime of the high seas was the late Admiral Mouton, who
wrote:
The sea-bed, the infinitely thin boundary between two media, is not a thing sus-
ceptible of occupation because we cannot consume it or effectively occupy it. We
do not make a difference in legal status between the surface of the sea and the
deeper layers of the sea. The surface of the sea is the top boundary of the sea,
and the sea-bed the bottom boundary. We should not make a difference in legal
status there either.39
This thesis may be contrasted with those international lawyers, repre-
sented here by the late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, who argued that the seabed
is susceptible of occupation. Thus Lauterpacht (generally a very strong
champion of the paramountcy of the freedom of the seas) wrote:
Although it is traditional to base some of these cases [i.e., cases of the control of
sedentary fisheries prior to the evolution of the customary norms of the continen-
3 See, e.g., (1) The Island of Palmas Case (United States v. Netherlands), 22 AM. J. INT'L L.
867 (1928); (2) The Clipperton Island Case (France v. Mexico), 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932);
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933] P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 53, 3 WORLD COURT
REPORTS 151 (M. Hudson ed. 1938). See also Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland
Islands Dependencies, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 311 at 314-18 (1948).
'See, e.g., United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965); Direct U.S. Cable v. Anglo-
American Telegraph Co., L.R. 2 App. Cas. 394 (1877). Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in
International Law, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 332 (1950).
"This position was even accepted by Gidel, a champion of the res communis school of
thought. See, e.g., GIDEL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER (3 vols. 1932). See
especially vol. 1, id., at 510. See also MATEESCO, VERS UN NOUVEAU DROIT INTERNATIONAL
DE LA MER 75-88 (1950) [hereinafter cited as MATEESCO]; Mouton, The Continental Shelf, 35
RECUEIL DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE 347 at 426-28 (1954-I)
[hereinafter cited as Moutno, Hague Lectures]; MOUTON, THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 290
(19521) [hereinafter cited as MOUTON, SHELF].
3 Mouton, Hague Lectures 452.
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tal shelf] on the ground of prescription, it is not inconsistent with principle, and is
more in accord with practice, to recognize that, as a matter of law, a State may
acquire, for sedentary fisheries and for other purposes, sovereignty and property
in the surface of the sea-bed, provided that in so doing it in no way interferes with
freedom of navigation and with the breeding of free-swimming fish. This is a
case in which the requirement of effectiveness, of occupation must be interpreted
by reference to the reason of the thing .... 40
Finally, Weslake, 41 Hurst,42 and Feith43 have all expressed the view that
the seabed should be regarded as falling under the regime of the subsoil
and can be acquired by the simple act of occupation. 44 In agreeing with
this latter group Kronmiller concludes his discussion of this debate by
observing that the "res communis theory, as applied to the seabed . . . has
not been supported by State practice, at least until recently . . . nor by the
majority of scholars."' 45 This observation has important seeds for the future
development of the author's thesis, and, indeed, is reflected in the conclud-
ing paragraph of Chapter II where Kronmiller writes (in part):
Thus, under the rubric of either res communis or res nullius, seabed resources
beyond the juridical continental shelf may lawfully be appropriated by any State
or private enterprise. Under the res communis theory, however, such appropria-
tion may not be carried out on the basis of a State claim to exclusive rights, unless
consolidated by acquiescence or confirmed by prescription, and to these excep-
tions little significance can be attributed in the present milieu.
46
C. The Legal Force of the Moratorium Resolution and of the
Declaration of Principles
The two Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly referred to
in the heading of this part of the discussion have formed the basis of the
attacks made both on claims of enterprises to mine for deep seabed hard
minerals and on proposals by states to enact domestic reciprocating legisla-
tion to regulate and give protection of investment to their miners' opera-
- I LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW (PEACE) 628-29 (8th ed. 2nd impres-
sion 1957). See also (1) Hurst, Whose Is the Bed of the Sea?, 4 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 34 (1923-
24); (2) Francois (Rapporteur for the International Law Commission), Second Report on the
High Seas, U.N. Doc. A/CN4/42 (mimeo, 10 April 1951). At 62 of A/CN. 4/42, Francois
wrote: "Beds where sedentary fishing is carried on have thus been regarded hitherto by littoral
states as being occupied and constituting property"; (3) FAUCHILLE, I Pt. 2, TRAITE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 19-20 (1925).
"See, e.g., WESTLAKE, I INTERNATIONAL LAW 187-88 (1910).
42 Hurst, Whose Is the Bed ofthe Sea? 4 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 43 (1923-24). See also SMITH,
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 122 (1935).
43 Feith, Rights to the Seabed and Its Subsoil.- The Importance of the "Continental Shelf"
Theory for the Exploration of Submarine Regions, REPORT OF THE FORTY-THIRD CONFER-
ENCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, BRUSSELS at 5 (1948). See also MATEESCO,
VERS UN NOUVEAU DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA MER 72 (1950).
"See I LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 628-29 (8th ed. 1955). In the
seventh edition of this (Peace) work, (vol. 1 at 576), the further requirement that the occupa-
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tions. Thus, for example, the "Group of Legal Experts" 4 7 stated in their
"Manifesto":
The principles set out in resolution 2749 (XXV) [Declaration of Principles Gov-
erning the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the
Limits of National Jurisdiction] are legally binding principles which were pro-
claimed in this Declaration and upheld by the affirmative vote of 108 States. It
should be added that a number of the few States (14) which abstained on that
occasion, although without formulating any objection, subsequently expressed,
either explicitly or implicitly, their support for those principles, as did other States
members of the international community, thus recognizing by their attitude the
force of international custom as expressed in Resolution 2749.
This custom has given rise to new general principles of public international law
which are the basis or legal foundation of any substantive norms regulating the
exploration of the area of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof
and the exploitation of their resources.
48
After a very thorough review of both the Declaration of Principles and of
the Moratorium Resolution in terms of the emergence of the thesis that
seabed hard minerals beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any state are the
"common heritage of mankind," Kronmiller argues that while acceptance
of the formula, as such, is widespread, if not universal, it remains, at least
for the present, without specific content or applicability. Indeed, it is argua-
ble that the phrase may also indicate the rights that "all states should have
access to the exploration and exploitation of the minerals of the ocean
floor,"' 4 9 and that this will hold until the present customary law regime is
replaced by a universally accepted treaty. (Exceptions to the current cus-
tomary regime may come into being, as amongst the parties, through more
particular treaty regimes, the transnational operations of appropriately
drafted domestic legislation creative of reciprocating regimes, and that to be
proposed to the participating states by the still currently negotiating Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Short of universal
acceptance, this last would necessarily remain a special treaty regime oper-
ating only among the parties to it.50 ) This last point, although obvious,
only too frequently appears to be forgotten one, in large part, perhaps, to
the enthusiastic rhetoric of those who wish to establish a new universal
regime ousting the present customary law system and especially the free-
"'See, supra, note 14.
"'Manifesto, supra note 14, at 4.4
'REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSoCIATION, 54TH CONFERENCE (THE HAGUE),
Aug. 23-29, 1970 at 824 [hereinafter referred to as 1970 I.L.A. REPORT]. Indeed Kronmiller, at
238-39, points out that this is an example of actions taken "not only within the UN, but also
outside it, to affirm and to give content to the notion of the common heritage of mankind." He
argues that this exemplifies, and testifies to the historical fact that the "common heritage
existed independently of the General Principles Resolution." Id. at 239.
'"On this issue, which has become, only too facilely blurred in debate, see the important
discussion by Jennings, The United States Draft Treaty on the International SeabedArea." Basic
Principles, 20 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 433, especially at 435-36 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Jen-
nings].
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dom of the high seas and the rights, liberties and privileges flowing there-
from.
The book under review further supports its thesis that the Declaration of
Principles does not constitute instant international law by pointing out that
it must be read in light of both the explanations of votes given to the First
Committee of the General Assembly and, quoting Professor Jennings,
states, "seen in the light of these explanations the Declaration assumes a
very different aspect from that reflected in the mere text of it."'5 Indeed, far
from having the legislative effect which, for example, the "Group of Legal
Experts" claim for it in their Manifesto,5 2 the Declaration of Principles has
not received either a universal opinio juris or the general support in state
practice by the states most significantly interested or directly affected. And
it must be emphasized that both of these two necesary conditions must be
met before the regime contemplated in the Declaration of Principles can
lawfully be said to have replaced the positive norms and established rights
and privileges here and now guaranteed by the freedom of the seas. On this
issue of the importance of practice, in addition to declarations evidencing
opinio juris sive necessitatis the International Court of Justice spoke
unequivocally in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases53 where it stated
that:
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also
be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to evidence a belief that this practice
is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. 4
It should be noted, furthermore, that the Court rejected an argument that
a principle of "equidistance" (Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Conven-
tion 55) had become crystallized into a customary rule of international law
through a combination of definitional refinement in the successive drafts of
the International Law Commission and the adoption of the Continental
Shelf Convention by the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea.5 6 It based this rejection on the ground of a lack of uniformity
of state practice in this regard in the past and the probability of an equal
lack of uniformity in the future through the permissibility of making
reservations with respect to Article 6 (and the other articles apart from
Articles 1-3).57
The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, however, now provide only a
rather early milestone on the road to an increasing acknowledgment of the
role of the General Assembly, conferences called by it, and its subsidiary
P. 246, quoting Jennings, supra note 50, at 439.
"See, supra notes 14 and 48 and the textual materials accompanying them.
13[1969] I.C.J. 3.
"Id. at 44. See also statements to a similar effect in (i) The Asylum Case [1950] I.C.J. 266,
277; (ii) The Lotus Case [19271 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10 at 28.
"Done April 29, 1958 [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578 at 4, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 312, 316
(effective June 10, 1964).
"6[1969] I.C.J. 3 at 38.
"[1969] I.C.J. 3 at 38-39.
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organs, in the formation of international law. (Space does not permit an
analysis of the classification of that law-i.e., as custom, general principles
of international law, etc.) Apart from areas where the General Assembly is
recognized as having a special competence, for example, in the regulation
of its subsidiary organs or of the Secretariat or over the territory of
Namibia,58 its Resolutions may be consulted as indicating trends in opinion
and, further, as betokening legal developments.
For example, in the Western Sahara case 59 the International Court of
Justice concluded that the right of self-determination for non-self-gov-
erning territories had become a norm of international law. In reaching the
conclusion it first looked to Article 1, paragraph 2 of the United Nations
Charter which based the United Nations' purpose of developing friendly
relations among nations "on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples .... ,,6o It then looked to the General
Assembly's Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples of 14 December 1960,61 and subsequent resolutions
and declarations on this topic. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case 62 the Court
looked, similarly, to conferences called by the General Assembly to under-
pin, in part, the concept of the "preferential rights of the coastal State in a
special situation .... ,,63 But here the Court also had recourse to a consid-
erable and supporting state practice to reinforce its thesis.64 Again, we find
a plenitude of state practice, quite aside from speaking and voting in the
General Assembly on the decolonization resolutions. Indeed there would
appear to have been a veritable race of imperial divestiture between those
who spoke and voted and the former colonial states who rapidly transferred
the powers of government to the peoples over whom they had once ruled.
The almost univeral divestiture of colonial power was also an important, if
barely mentioned, element underpinning the Court's perspective in the
Western Sahara case. 65 It, indeed, reflected the decisive state practice so
essential for establishing the existence of a rule of customary international
"See, Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia.(South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16 [hereinafter referred to as The Namibia Case].
"gWestern Sahara, Advisory Opinion [1975] I.C.J. 12.
'See also The Namibia Case at 31.
6 U.N.G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16 at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961).
"Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits [1974] I.C.J. 3. For an early,
discriminating and seminal view of the status, in international law, of Resolutions of the Gen-
eral Assembly, see Judge Lauterpacht in South-West Africa-Voting Procedure, Advisory
Opinion of June 7, 1955 [1955] I.C.J. 67 at 115.
"
3Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits [1974] I.C.J. 3 at 26.
-Note, for example, the Court's comment, "State practice on the subject of fisheries reveals
an increasing and widespread acceptance of the concept of preferential rights for coastal
States, particularly in favor of countries or territories in a situation of special dependence on
coastal fisheries," id. at 26. In reviewing "state practice" the Court looked, not only to resolu-
tions and declarations at conferences, but also agreements and arrangements in the North-East
Atlantic and North-East Arctic. 1d. at 26.
-1[1975] I.C.J. 12 at 29-35.
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law. In addition we should not lose sight of the fact that the resolutions,
like the divestures, were merely spelling out the modalities and carrying
into fruition the obligations which states had assumed under the United
Nations Charter and consented to in adhering to that basic text.
In this context, then, the essential quality of consent in terms of assenting
votes, practical performance, and participation remains an essential ele-
ment. The stage has not been reached whereby parliamentary diplomacy
can be used as a tool in the hands of large majorities of states in the General
Assembly and at conferences to impose repugnant obligations on dissenting
minorities, especially when such impositions effectively exclude the minori-
ties' inputs into the prescriptive arena.6 6 Nor may those majorities use their
numbers to divest minorities' interests of meaningfulness.
In addition to these considerations this reviewer has offered elsewhere an
argument more specifically relevant to the issue of the status of the Declara-
tion of Principles in terms of its failure to have crystallized into customary
international law. It is as follows:
Have these resolutions (i.e., the Moratorium Resolution and the Declaration of
Principles) crystallized into law? And would such a law make illegal any form of
deep seabed mining beyond national jurisdiction outside the regime to be devised
at UNCLOS III?
At the San Francisco Conference of 1945 which drafted the Charter of the
United Nations, a proposal was made which would have given the General
Assembly power to declare international law. This was firmly rejected. But what
would then be the status of such Resolutions as those containing the declarations
of the "common heritage"? There are two levels of effectiveness to be considered.
First, resolutions of this kind, of themselves, cannot be self-executing. They are
not legislation with immediately obligating effects. Some resolutions, however,
such as that on decolonization, through both the widespread support they
received and the speedy implementation of their goals in the practice of states,
especially in practice of the former colonizing states, have become recognized as
customary international law. On the other hand, when implementation by uni-
versal or near universal state practice is lacking, the relevant resolutions have
merely the quality of the "policy directives" of say, the Irish and Indian Constitu-
tions.
But such "policy directives" are not entirely ineffective. They do at least
impose duties of respect and recognition by virtue of their moral force. A state
acting against their terms should thoroughly consider its compelling reasons for
so acting, especially if, while some states choose to ignore that directive, others
are building up a state practice in its support. So far, there has been little, if any,
state practice implementing the "common heritage" principle.
There is a further consideration. Where states act, even if in order to imple-
ment a General Assembly Resolution, in a manner which invades the existing
rights of other states and involves breaches of international law, further grave
issues are raised. Today, for example, the seizure of a foreign flag ship, without
lawful justification (that is, without the justification of a treaty or a customary
international law right or privilege so to act), is a breach of the customary inter-
'On the important notion of the "prescriptive arena" in the formation of international obli-
gations, see McDougal, Laswell, and Reisman, The World Constitutive Process ofAuthoritative
Division, I THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 73 (Black & Falk eds. 1969).
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national law of the sea. It also involves a breach of the United Nations Charter
(including Article 2, paragraph 4).67 While, traditionally, customary interna-
tional law could once have been created through acts which were originally
unlawful if acquiesced to for a sufficiently long period and on a sufficiently wide
basis, it is doubtful whether the world community would today accept a legal
principle based on acts in defiance of the United Nations Charter. It is to be
doubted, furthermore, if the essential ingredient of acquiescence would be forth-
coming. It should be noted, therefore, that a state practice seeking to implement
the "common heritage" principles should not itself be steeped in initial illegality.
This may well leave the establishment of that principle to the consent of the states
concerned in a universal or nearly universal convention rather than through the
high-handed unilateral and illegal acts of states seeking, through confrontation
tactics, to establish what they claim (and mistakenly claim, it is insisted) to be a
state practice leading to the creation of a proposed rule of customary interna-
tional law.
It seems to me, therefore, that here and now we are in a situation of stasis. On
the one hand, there is an imminent possibility of change; on the other, there is no
body of law prohibiting deep seabed mining. Furthermore, many of the acts
which might be taken to prevent such mining could themselves constitute serious
breaches of international law-for example, infringement of the rights of the flag
nation of a mining ship, breaches of the "rules of the road," and illegal searches
and seizures.6 8
In agreement with the above Kronmiller points out that the Western
developed countries and Japan on the one hand, and the Group of 77 and
the Soviet bloc on the other, "maintain diametrically opposed positions
concerning the lawfulness of deep seabed mining under the present regime
of the high seas."
69
While disagreement rages over the lawfulness of deep seabed mining,
Kronmiller perceives two points on which there is, broadly, agreement
between all three ideological groupings or "camps." The first such central
idea is that the international community as a whole must benefit from the
exploitation of the resources of the deep seabed and subsoil beyond
national jurisdiction. This applies equally to a future, possible, universal
conventional regime, and to the customary international law regime now in
existence, notwithstanding the disagreement on whether or not a morato-
rium has now been imposed on seabed mining under the current regime of
the oceans. The second essential matter on which Kronmiller perceives a
fairly general agreement, but not necessarily a universal acceptance, is a
precept that states may not claim or exercise sovereignty, or sovereign
6 Article 2, paragraph 4 states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
It seems strange to this reviewer that the "Group of Legal Experts" would advocate (see,
supra, text accompanying notes 14, 47 and 48) and a senior representative of the United States
(see, infra text accompanying note 88) would justify, an argument, and put forward as a prem-
ise, supporting, or at least sympathizing with, conduct constituting such a palpable breach of
the Charter of the United Nations.
" Goldie, Customary International law and Deep Seabed Mining Symposium, Mining the Deep
Seabed- A Range of Perspectives 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 173 at 180-82 (1979).
69P. 340.
312 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
rights, over the seabed and subsoil of the deep ocean floor beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction. 70
A further point of interest in this chapter of the book under review is
Kronmiller's view that even if, for the vast majority of states, namely the
Group of 77 and the Soviet bloc, the common heritage of mankind now
operates as a norm of prohibition against their engaging in deep seabed
mining, it still would not be effective to deny "the United States, Belgium,
the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and
Japan, inter alia' '7 1 their rights under the doctrine of the freedom of the
high seas to engage in deep seabed mining. These states have consistently
maintained their view that the common heritage of mankind will have legal
force and prohibitory effect only after its detailed, institutional modalities
and its denotations, in terms of specific, cogent rules and administration,
have been operationally established under an acceptable Law of the Sea
Treaty.
In concluding this part of the current debate we should perceive that,
when we are really confronted by an argument asserting that the resources
of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction constitute "the com-
mon heritage of mankind" is now part of international law we are also
faced by arguments about the meaning of the word "law." While the
phrase has been accepted as a legal value, a program of development, still,
the constitutive processes of international law have not yet operated to
abridge a previous right, let alone revoke it. Thus, while all agree on the
community interest in seabed nodules, and the need to develop prescriptive
rules rendering that interest effective, only an extremist militant, or a pawky
humorist, can equivalate the taking of manganese nodules to the classically
prohibited acts on the high seas regarded as crimes jure gentium, namely,
piracy, the slave trade, and war crimes.
The significance of the meaning of the word "law" to the above debate is
that there are those jurists who invest the term with an extensive meaning
and include underlying values, policies and goals. In contradistinction to
this notion of "law" in its broadest sense there are "the more limited legal"
connotations of the word. In this latter view law is only constituted by pre-
scriptive rules capable of guiding choices and conduct. Here legal values
and policies are classified as "principles of legislation" or "metalegal"
rather than as "law" pure and simple. The latter meaning is the one gener-
ally to be preferred, and is the more professionally accurate and meaning-
ful. The thesis that the "common heritage of mankind" doctrine constitutes
positive law, here and now, confuses lexferenda with lex lata. The propo-
nents of this confusion may find such an argument to be a two-edged sword
which could turn in their hands.
'"For a discussion of these two "essential matters" (upon which Kronmiller perceives
"broad" and the other "fairly general" agreement), see pp. 340-44.
" P. 343.
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If the taking of nodules is as vile an act as the slave trade or piracy why is
there no legal turpitude in killing such intelligent, peaceable and important
fellow mammals as whales, porpoises and seals?
D. "Peremptory Norms" and the
Declaration of Principles
Developing from the discussion of the status of the "common heritage of
mankind" doctrine and the Moratorium Resolution as instant customary
international law, there is a further point advocated by the representatives
of the more militant members of the Group of 77. The argument begins
with the proposition, itself of very doubtful legal validity, that paragraph 1
of the General Assembly's Declaration of Principles has dedicated the hard
minerals of the deep seabeds to the world community's use as a whole and
effectively denies private access, except by permission of the representatives
of "all the peoples of the world."'72 Seeking to give further juridical point to
this idea of dedication is the additional claim that the doctrine of "common
heritage of mankind" in the seabeds enjoys the special status of beingjus
cogens-that is, constitutes a peremptory norm.7
3
While Kronmiller indicates an awareness of this increasingly touchy
question, 74 he does not highlight it to the degree which this reviewer would
have like to see. While the claim that the Declaration of Principles is
instant prohibitory international law may attack the rights of individuals to
engage in deep seabed mining and the authority of states to legislate
regimes governing such activities, the claim that it reflects an emerged and
established peremptory norm goes much further. That second assertion
would add that any agreement, bilateral or multilateral, allowing access to
mining by privately owned or state owned enterprises would iusofacto be
void and without any protective force or validity. It also raises, at least as a
question, and possibly even as an assertion, a very important second corol-
lary, namely, that so to designate the "common heritage" principle may
well reflect an intention to characterize seabed mining, when conducted
outside the "regime to be established," as a crime which, like piracy, consti-
tutes an offense/ure gentium. This reviewer will now briefly adumbrate the
kind of argument he would like to have seen spelled out at length in the
"2See, e.g., Galindo Pohl (El Salvador), U.N. Doc. A/C.I/PV. 1781 at 3 (1970).
"See, e.g., Mr. Zegers (Chile), U.N. Doc. A/C.I/PV. 1775 at 2 (1970), where he said, inter
alia:
Legally, we might contend that it is an indivisible property with fruits that can be divided.
But politically and economically speaking, it means that all states, coastal or landlocked,
will participate in the administration of the sea-bed beyond national jurisdiction and in the
benefits derived from that region.
See also the representatives of Guyana, Peru, Venezuela, Malaysia, Libya, Nigeria, Yugo-
slavia and Brazil el al. U.N. Docs. A/C I/PV. 1788 at 2, 10, 13 (1970); A/C. I/PV. 1786 at 2
(1970); A/C. I/PV. 1780 at 2, 3 (1970); A/C. I/PV. 1784 at 7 (1970); and A/C. 1/PV. 1777 at
11 (1970).
"See p. 263 n.506; p. 301 n.558. See also pp. 326 and 333-34 (for a survey of some cognate
issues).
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book under review to meet the advocacy of those who claim that the "com-
mon heritage" principle is, here and now, a norm withjus cogens effect.
Generally speaking, the doctrine stating that certain rules of international
law are so fundamental that they cannot be abridged by treaty, the original
concept ofjus cogens or peremptory norms, finds its roots in Article 53 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which states:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character. 7
Since the concept ofjus cogens thus enunciated was originally perceived
as providing for the avoidance of treaties conflicting with the norms indi-
cated in Article 53, and hence not unlike the function of certain public pol-
icy rules in the Anglo-American common law of contracts, a legitimate
question arises. How did this rule for avoiding agreements become a rule
of prohibition of conduct other, possibly, than the conduct involved with
treaty making? Does it create rights in rem?
In draft Article 18, paragraph 2 of the International Law Commission's
Draft Articles on State Responsibility 76 we find the following reference to
peremptory norms in context, not of rules governing the nullification of
contracts, but of exculpation from state responsibility for a wrongful act.
That draft paragraph states:
However, an act of the State which, at the time when it was performed, was not in
conformity with what was required of it by an international obligation in force
for that State, ceases to be considered an internationally wrongful act if, subse-
quently, such an act has become compulsory by virtue of a peremptory norm of
general international law.
77
The International Law Commission's Rapporteur on State Responsibil-
ity, Professor Roberto Ago, as Judge Ago of the International Court of Jus-
tice then was, explained both his reference to peremptory norms and the
intendment of this paragraph by reference to a number of examples, of
which the following two will suffice (the former envisaging the exculpation
from a treaty obligation, the latter relating to a duty of conduct):
[I]t is not inconceivable that an international tribunal might now be called upon
to settle a dispute concerning the international responsibility of a state which,
75Opened for signature at Vienna, May 23, 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980, MULTI-
LATERAL TREATIES IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PERFORMS DEPOSI-
TORY FUNCTIONS 597, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. D/13 (Sales No.: E.80.V.10 (1980)). In
addition, it has been widely argued that the Treaty codifies the relevant principles of the cus-
tomary international law of treaties and, hence, reflects principles bindings on states who have
not deposited their ratifications.
"
6Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Twenty-Eighth Session, 3
May-23 July 1976, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10 at 174 and 206, U.N. Doc. A/31/10 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as A/31/10].
77Id.
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being bound by a treaty to deliver arms to another state, had refused to fulfil its
obligation, knowing that the arms were to be used for the perpetration of aggres-
sion or genocide or for maintaining by force a policy of apartheid, and had done
so before the rules of jus cogens outlawing genocide and aggression had been
established, thus making refusal not only lawful, but obligatory. Similarly, if it
were accepted that, as some maintain, a peremptory rule is in process of forma-
tion, which requires states to give assistance to a people struggling to free itself
from foreign domination, it would be impossible to continue to treat as interna-
tionally wrongful assistance rendered under those conditions at a time when the
right to self-determination was not yet recognized and such assistance constituted
internationally wrongful interference in the domestic affairs of the country
against which the struggle was directed.
78
Again, in his draft Article 19, which projected state criminal responsibil-
ity to the international community as a whole for certain acts, the Rap-
porteur saw the doctrine ofjus cogens performing a key role quite apart
from treaties and contractual relations. In this context the Rapporteur
envisaged a situation where a member state of the international community
had the privilege, and indeed the duty, to take preventive and/or punitive
action against a state perpetrating the breach of an international rule which
is held to be peremptory. In support of his thesis to the effect that peremp-
tory norms could proscribe conduct outside the field of international agree-
ments and in terms of general duties of behavior, the Rapporteur cited the
Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited
(Second Phase)79 where the International Court of Justice stated that:
In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of
a state towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-A-
vis another state in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the
former are the concern of all states. In view of the importance of the rights
involved, all states can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are
obligations erga omnes ...
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from
the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles
and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection
from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of pro-
tection have entered into the body of general international law (Reservations to
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advi-
sory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 23); others are conferred by international
instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character.
Obligations the performance of which is the subject of diplomatic protection
are not the same category. It cannot be held, when one such obligation in partic-
ular is in question, in a specific case, that all states have a legal interest in its
observance.80
While the International Law Commission's Rapporteur cited the exam-
ples of apartheid, slavery, genocide, the waging of wars of aggression and





determination of peoples, such as that prohibiting the establishment or
maintenance by force of colonial domination,"' 8 1 it is also clear that his list
is not a closed one. Indeed the free development of many additions to
Judge Ago's list would appear to have the promise of a bright future. For
example, such an additional item was asserted by Libyan Arab Republic
(albeit unsuccessfully) in the Arbitration Between the Libyan Arab Republic
and the California Asiatic Oil Company and the Texaco Overseas Petroleum
Company.82 The Libyan Arab Republic argued that the United Nations
General Assembly's Resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources83 constitute peremptory norms (normsjure cogentis), that is they
provide "a supreme principle justifying nationalization in every case." 84
Libya was also quoted as saying, in its memorandum of 26 July 1974:
Nationalization is an act related to the sovereignty of the state. This fact has been
recognized by the consecutive Resolutions of the United Nations on the sover-
eignty of states over their natural resources, the last being Resolution No. 317 1 of
the United Nations General Assembly adopted on December 13, 1973, as well as
paragraph (4/E) of Resolution No. 3201 (S. VI) adopted on 1 May, 1974. The
said Resolutions confirm that every state maintains complete right to exercise full
sovereignty over its natural resources and recognize Nationalization as being a
legitimate and internationally recognized method to ensure the sovereignty of the
state upon such resources. Nationalization, being related to the sovereignty of the
state, is not subject to foreign jurisdiction. Provisions of the International Law do
not permit a dispute with a state to be referred to any Jurisdiction other than its
national Jurisdiction. In affirmance of this principle, Resolutions of the General
Assembly provide that any dispute related to Nationalization or its consequences
should be settled in accordance with provisions of domestic law of the state.
85
This may not now suggest, however, that the Libyan argument contains a
potential for saying that the espousal of claims on behalf of persons or
enterprises whose properties have been expropriated could come to be
viewed as an international crime.8 6 Rather, it seeks to tell us that the sover-
eign power of nationalizing property cannot be contracted away, and that
clauses providing for arbitration and compensation may be subsequently
rescinded unilaterally by the nationalizing State, without recourse to an
international forum or reference to international law. It may be asked,
however, how the Libyan assertion, in the California Asiatic Arbitration,
bears upon Judge Ago's open-ended list of acts for which responsibility is
"Draft Article 19.3(b) of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State
Responsibility in International Law, A/31/10 at 175 and 226.
2See Award on the Merits, 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1 (1978); see also Lalive, Un grand
arbitragepelrolier entre un Gouvernement et deux socikt4sprivkes 'trangbres, 104 JOURNAL DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 319, appendix at 350-89 (1977).
3G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), S-6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. I at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
"Award on the Merits, 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 26 (1978), 104 JOURNAL DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 319 at 373.
"'Awardon the Merits at 101-102, 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 26 (1978), 104 JOURNAL DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 319, 374-75.
"See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Twenty-Eighth Ses-
sion (3 May-23 July 1976), UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFFICIAL RECORDS, 31st
Sess., Supp. No. 10 at 288-90, U.N. Doc. A/31/10 (1976).
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owed erga omnes, and which thus constitute crimes to which the labeljus
cogens applies in its nontreaty setting. This arises, first, from the thesis that
the United Nations General Assembly's Resolutions on Permanent Sover-
eignty over Natural Resources87 constitute indestructible legal bulwarks
against the implementation of agreements which may be perceived as
abridging nations' fundamental rights to determine their own destinies.
Second, this leads to the proposition if such agreements are to be vindicated
by the assertion of countervailing rights (for example, those based on the
integrity of concessions and contracts) they are to be viewed as denials of
the "right of self-determination of peoples." Hence such claims may be
characterized, under the jus cogens thesis, as wrongful acts for which the
state espousing the integrity of a citizen's contract against an expropriation
may be held responsible erga omnes. Does such reasoning as the foregoing
provide a parallel in the context of the alleged right (and indeed duty?) of
each and every state to protect the common heritage of mankind? Are all
states to be entitled, in breach of American and other countries' miners'
freedom of the high seas, in Ambassador Aldrich's phrase, to "take action
against pirate vessels on the high seas, 'robbing the common heritage?'- 88
Indeed, one may ask whether this last comment was made in terms of a
perception that such seizures would be premised on the idea of the common
heritage constituting jus cogens and on the view that such a premise would
condone uses of force on the high seas which would otherwise constitute
unlawful interferences with the jurisdiction of flag states and, indeed, a
breach of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.
Be that as it may, in the California Asiatic Arbitration the Arbitrator's
appraisal of the legal impact of the General Assembly's Resolutions on Per-
manent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, as invoked by Libya, provides
a perceptive and succinct analysis of the status, here and now, of a jus
cogens argument, as well as one relating to the status of resolutions of the
United Nations General Assembly. Professor Ren6-Jean Dupuy said:
As this Tribunal has already indicated, the legal value of the resolutions which
are relevant to the present case can be determined on the basis of circumstances
under which they were adopted and by analysis of the principles which they state:
With respect to the first point, the absence of any binding force of the resolu-
tions of the General Assembly of the United Nations implies that such resolu-
"See, supra, note 29 and the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions and Declara-
tions cited thereat.
"See Ambassador Aldrich's Panel Comment of Goldie, Customary International Law and
Deep Seabed Mining, Symposium, Mining the Deep Seabed- A Range of Perspectives, 6 SYRA-
CUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 173 at 196 (1979), where he said:
We cannot exclude the possibility of state action against seabed mining vessels. Nor can we
exclude the possibility that such state action would be pursuant to what purported to be an
authorization from the United Nations General Assembly to take action against "pirate ves-
sels on the high seas, robbing the common heritage." This is not inconceivable.
(Ambassador George Aldrich was, at the time this statement originally was published, a
United States ambassador and the Deputy Representative of the President of the United States
at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea).
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tions must be accepted by the members of the United Nations in order to be
legally binding. In this respect, the Tribunal notes that only Resolution 1803
(XVII) of 14 December 1962 was supported by a majority of member states
representing all of the various groups. By contrast, the other Resolutions men-
tioned above, and in particular those referred to in the Libyan Memorandum,
were supported by a majority of states but not by any of the developed coun-
tries with market economies which carry on the largest part of international
trade.
With respect to the second point, to wit, the appraisal of the legal value on
the basis of the principles stated, it appears essential to this Tribunal to distin-
guish between those provisions stating the existence of a right on which the
generality of the states has expressed agreement and those provisions introduc-
ing new principles which were rejected by certain representative groups of
states and having nothing more than a de legeferenda value only in the eyes of
the states which have adopted them; as far as the others are concerned, the
rejection of these same principles implies that they consider them as being con-
tra legem .89
And Professor Virally has reinforced this appraisal of the Charter of the
Economic Rights and Duties in the following observation:
It is therefore clear that the Charter is not a first step to codification and progres-
sive development of international law, within the meaning of Article 13, para.
l(a) of the Charter of the United Nations, that is to say an instrument purporting
to formulate in writing the rules of customary law and intended to better adjust
its content to the requirements of international relations. The persisting differ-
ence of opinions in respect to some of its articles prevented reaching this goal and
it is healthy that people have become aware of this.
90
We must now add to Professor Virally's observation the further thought
from this Arbitration, namely that the unanimous or near-unanimous con-
viction which promotes what may have achieved acceptance as a rule of
customary international law (and hence modifiable by treaty) into a per-
emptory norm cannot be achieved without the overwhelming evidences of
the fixed belief of mankind in the necessity, moral compulsion and cat-
egorial prescriptiveness of such a rule and, furthermore, without incontro-
vertible evidence of its foundation in a universal public philosophy and in a
belief of right action ecumenically embraced throughout the world's major
ideologies.
While Ago's theory of peremptory norms in the field of state responsibil-
ity other than treaties is not widely supported amongst Western govern-
ments and publicists, it is strongly supported in the Soviet bloc9' and
among the representatives of the more militant members of the Group of
77.92 Among the latter group are those who see in Ago's second and more
extended meaning ofjus cogens the means of stigmatizing the implementa-
"A ward on the Merits at 111-12; INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 30 (1980) 104 JOURNAL DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 319 at 378-79.
'Vitally, La Charte des Drofts el Devoirs Econorniques des Etals, "Notes de Lecture," 20
ANNUAIRE FRANOAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 57 at 59 (1974).
9ITUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 381-85 (Butler, W., transl. 1974).
"
2See, supra, note 73.
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tion of the United States' technological developments in seabed mining as a
crime erga omnes and, hence, as "piratical. ' '93
Indeed at the Ninth Session (Second Part) of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, held in Geneva July-August, 1980 the
representative of Chile made an informal proposal that the common heri-
tage concept constitutes a peremptory norm. The Chile proposal was as
follows:
Jus cogens
The States Parties to the present Convention accept and recognize on behalf of
the international community as a whole that the provision relating to the com-
mon heritage of mankind set out in article 136 is a peremptory norm of general
international law from which no derogation is permitted and which, conse-
quently, can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character. 94
As a number of delegates asserted either resistance to,95 or a failure to
understand, 96 this proposal, a modified proposal which the President of the
Conference considered to have achieved consensus, was put forward. That
clause whichpro tern became paragraph 6 of Article 305 of the Informal
Composite Negotiating Text Revision 2, was as follows:
The States Parties to this Convention agree that there can be no amendments to
the basic principle relating to the common heritage of mankind set forth in article
136 and they shall not be party to any agreement in derogation thereof.97
Article 136 of the Negotiating Text, to which this paragraph makes reference,
provides the Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind. 98
This formula was finally consolidated at the resumed ninth session,
Geneva 28 July-29 August, 1980 in that session's Draft Convention on the
Law of the Sea (Informal Text)99 it was incorporated in Article 311, para-
graph 6 and was finally written in the following terms:
The States Parties to this Convention agree that there can be no amendments to
the basic principle relating to the common heritage of mankind set forth in article
136 and that they shall not be party to any agreement in derogation thereof.L°°
"See, supra, note 88, & accompanying text.
'"Informal Proposal GP/9 dated 5 August 1980. See also Report of the President of the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea on the Work of the Informal Plenary
on General Provisions at 2-3 (paragraph 3), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/L.58 (mimeo, 22 August
1980).
"The Western European countries and Japan spoke emphatically against this proposal. The
Soviet Union said that no treaty exists which creates a peremptory norm, except for the Char-
ter of the United Nations, and that such a proposal was outside the competence of the Confer-
ence.
'For example, the delegation of the United States of America.
"Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Informal Composite Negotiating
Text/Provisions 2 at 76, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62 /WP. 10/Rev. 2 (mimeo, I I April 1980).
9 Report of the President of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea on
the Work of the Informal Plenary on General Provisions at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/L. 58
(mimeo, 22 August 1980).
"U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Rev. 3/Add. I (mimeo, 23 August 1980).
1001d. at 122.
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It may be asked, reading these two provisions together, what the new
paragraph achieves. Starting from the premise that parties accepting it
intend that it should not be entirely meaningless then, clearly, it means
more than a promise not to be in breach of Article 136 for this would
merely make the paragraph redundant.
It should be noted, moreover, that Article 136 says nothing substantive
about "common heritage." Accordingly, it is at least arguable, and no
doubt will be argued by supporters of thejus cogens thesis, that the express
incorporation of Article 136 into the above "compromise" paragraph neces-
sarily carries with it the implication that it should be interpreted in light of
Article 137 which states:
1. No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part
of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or juridical person,
appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or sov-
ereign rights, nor such appropriation shall be recognized.
2. All rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole, on
whose behalf the Authority shall act. These resources are not subject to alien-
ation. The minerals derived from the Area, however, may only be alienated in
accordance with this Part and the rules and regulations adopted thereunder.
3. No State or natural or juridical person shall claim, acquire or exercise rights
with respect to the minerals of the Area except in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Part. Otherwise, no such claim, acquisition or exercise of such
rights shall be recognized.
Such an argument, would be based on a thesis that there is a necessary
implication to the effect that Article 136 is only understandable in light of
Article 137, since Article 136, standing alone, does not spell out the mean-
ing, the modalities, and the scope of the "common heritage" concept. This
could only be countered by something like a bald assertion to the effect that
paragraph 6 expressly incorporates Article 136 and only 136, and that the
rule of interpretation inclusio unius exclusio est ulterius applies. But this
type of traditional argumentation has many traits of weakness. It relies on
legal dogmatics. Furthermore, as Professor McDougal has pointed out, in
treaty interpretation every traditional rule or interpretation or construction
may also be countered by its contrary proposition and the choice of an
applicable rule of interpretation depends on such metalegal considerations
as the intention of the parties and the purpose of the agreement.' 0'
"McDougal, Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties: Statement to Committee of the
Whole, April19, 1968, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1021, 1023 (1968), quoting LORD McNAIR, LAW OF
TREATIES 372 (1961). See also McDougal, supra at 1024 where he again quoted Lord McNair
(LAW OF TREATIES) at 366 as follows:
This so-called rule of interpretation, like others is merely a starting point, a prima facie
guide, and cannot be allowed to obstruct the essential quest in the application of treaties,
namely, the search for the real intention of the contracting parties in the language used by
them (author's emphasis).
See also McDOUGAL, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
passim (1967). See also STONE, LEGAL CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 226 (1954)
where he wrote (with regard to the interpretation of key (the "veto") provisions of the United
Nations Charter):
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Second, the reference to, indeed the invocation of, the word "derogation"
in the "compromise" paragraph 6 is redolent of the special case of princi-
ples having the authority ofjus cogens under Article 53 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties.' 0 2 If this compromise provision had,
indeed, been fairly drafted so as to effectively reflect the Western European
and other states' opposition to the Chilean proposal, it might well have
omitted a term so fundamentally reminiscent ofjus cogens and the categori-
cal peremptoriness of the regime which that term invokes.
Third, in his Explanatory Memorandum of the Conference10 3 the Presi-
dent of the Conference wrote:
The other item dealt with under General Provisions was the concept ofjus
cogens on which a compromise was accepted. . . . It was agreed that it be incor-
porated as a new paragraph 6 of Article 311 of the Final Clauses on relations to
other conventions and international agreements.'°4
This explicit characterization of Article 311, paragraph 6, as endowing
the common heritage principle with the authority of jus cogens surely
embeds in concrete the idea that agreement to this clause invalidates mini-
treaties and even permits the characterization of deep seabed mining
outside the "regime to be established" as an international crime.
In light of these considerations it is regretfully suggested that should the
United States negotiate a treaty (a "mini-treaty") with states, such as
France and the Federal Republic of Germany for example, of whom the
former is actively considering the enactment of similar domestic legislation
to the United States' recently enacted seabed mining law and the latter has
already done so, it would be arguable that even if the mini-treaty were to
assert a recognition and respect for the common heritage principle, it would
still be vulnerable to attack, not only diplomatically and in such interna-
tional fora as the General Assembly of the United Nations, but domesti-
cally by the mini-treaty's opponents as illegal, invalid and contrary to
provisions accepted by the states at the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea. Thus, the new "compromise" paragraph 6 of the
latest text's Article 311 would, inevitably, expose the United States and the
countries with which it was negotiating to charges of bad faith toward the
Conference and of committing a breach of the spirit and intention of Article
18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which provides that:
Obligation not to defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force
These competing starting points might, of course, yield opposite results on a particular
matter if both were simultaneously applied to it .... [T]he effect of the competition of
starting points is merely that the choice between them is determined by politics, not by law.
See also (for a similar discussion of statutory interpretation) STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND
LAWYERS' REASONING 288-98 (1964).
"
2See, supra, note 75 & accompanying text.
'°
3U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP. 10/Rev. 3 at xix (mimeo. 28 August 1898).
"Ibid at xxi.
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A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose
of a treaty when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its
intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry
into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly
delayed. 105
E. The Lawfulness of Deep Seabed Mining under
Customary Law and the 1958 Geneva
Conventions on the Law of the Sea
The section of the book under review dealing with the above-captioned
topic begins with a detailed study of the translation of the customary inter-
national law norms into the relevant multilateral conventions which the
1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea produced at
Geneva. Taking as his starting point for this section of the book the propo-
sition that these conventions "did little more than cast the traditional pat-
tern of the international law of the sea into an authoritative form,
consecrate several emerging doctrines. . . as existing law, and introduce
some reforms, ' ' 06 Kronmiller observes that, unlike the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, the 1958 Conference (the first of
the series; the second, in 1960 was brief and barren of lasting effectiveness)
was largely technical in nature. The drafting of the four conventions it suc-
cessfully produced was also largely free of the ideological confrontations
and demands which have complicated negotiations and delayed the draft-
ing of generally satisfactory formulae at the present (the Third) Conference.
The fact that the International Law Commission's drafts dominated the first
conference reflects the great change that has occurred to the ideological col-
oring of the law of the sea in the intervening few years (1958-1967), (this
latter year being the date of the first forerunner of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, namely, the United Nations General
Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee to study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed
and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction107 ).
Passing from the history of the 1958 conventions, the book under review
then takes up the thesis of "Reasonableness as the General Criterion of
Lawfulness."' 0 8 The criterion of reasonableness as providing a basis for
supporting the legality of a use which may operate to limit other uses tem-
'°'See, supra note 75.
o P. 358, quoting Goldie, The Management of Ocean Resources Regimefor Structuring the
Maritime Environment (THE FUTURE OF THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT), 4 THE FUTURE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 155 at 175-76 (Black & Falk eds. 1972).
°10 This ad hoc committee was established under U.N. General Assembly Resolution A/
RES/2340 (XXII).
,""Pp. 388-408.
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porarily, or with regard to an area relevant to that activity, is reviewed, first,
in terms of the debate, prior to the 1958 Conference on the lawfulness of
nuclear testing and the engaging in military training exercises on the high
seas.' 0 9 In addition, that standard was examined in terms of more general
issues and in light of the notion that reasonableness indicates that reciprocal
or shared interests demand mutual restraint."10 The International Law
Commission's discussions of whether "reasonableness" or "adversely
affect" was the appropriate criterion for legality were also perceptively sum-
marized.
Kronmiller's discussion of Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the High Seas, and especially the use of the phrase inter alia in the chapeau
of that Article appeared rather to belabor the point. Neither the Interna-
tional Law Commission nor the Conference seriously considered that, in
listing four freedoms they were precluding others, for example, the freedom
of scientific research on the high seas. But out of the discussion of the open-
endedness of the list of freedoms in Article 2 Kronmiller developed the
more crucial argument that uses of the sea which were unknown, or at least
unexercised, in 1958 were not unlawful merely because they were not con-
templated, let alone not enumerated, in the drafting of, or discussions lead-
ing to, Article 2. The open-endedness of the list and the generality of the
freedom of the seas per se, readily permit new activities to be brought
within the scope of that freedom. The denotations may extend; the conno-
tation remains the same.
In sum Kronmiller argued that: (1) uses of the sea are not unlawful
merely because they may have adverse effects upon the exercise of other
uses since the standard of reasonableness-the prohibition merely of unjus-
tifiable interference-governs; (2) the list of lawful uses is not closed ("does
not constitute a closed set") I I' hence the freedom of the seas is an evolving
doctrine permitting new technologically oriented activities; and (3) there is
no hierarchy of lawful uses, permitting one use precludes another. Hence
deep seabed mining is not unlawful under the key provisions of the 1958
Geneva High Seas and Continental Shelf Conventions. Nor is it contrary
to the general principles of international law and the rules of customary law
merely because it is a nascent use of the seas which may have some adverse
impact on established uses.
"°'In this context McDougal's teaching played a dominant role. See (1) McDougal & Schlei,
Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective- Lawful Measures/or Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1955),
reprinted in McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 763 (1960); (2)
McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L L.
356 (1955). Many other publicists were, of course, also cited in the context of the discussion of
the standard of reasonableness.
"'McDoUGAL & BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 87 (1962).
"P. 449.
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F. Analogies with Other Selected Lawful
Exercises of the Freedom of the High Seas
The book under review engages in a survey of uses of the high seas
which, like the taking of manganese nodules, involve: (1) ownership result-
ing from the capture of the denizens of the seas; (2) the exercise of high seas
freedoms; (3) the permissible use of the sea which may constitute a not
unreasonable interference with other uses; and (4) the jurisdiction of the
flag state over the vessels on the high seas engaging in the activity under
review and offered as an analogy. The analogies which are presented as
showing some, or all, of these features are: (1) fishing; (2) laying and main-
taining submarine cables; (3) marine scientific research; (4) use of the sea-
bed for certain military purposes; (5) ocean dumping, including the disposal
of certain radioactive wastes; (6) gunnery and bombing practice; and (7)
large scale naval exercises. The relevance and effectiveness of each of these
activities will be reviewed in turn.
1. FISHING
The parallels Kronmiller finds between high seas fishing and the mining
of manganese nodules are to be found in the acquisition of ownership of
individual items through capture, without any exclusive claim to a particu-
lar area or to the resources found in the area. In addition, he argues that
fisheries derived from exclusive rights based on occupation or prescription
(presumably sedentary or historic fisheries) "may be analogized to deep
seabed mining undertaken subject to a similar legal claim."" 2 Third,
because large fishing fleets may effectively, but lawfully, exclude, or at least
hamper, other equally privileged uses of the sea at the times and locations
of their operations, the test of what may be unjustifiable interference in this
context is flexible and dependent on the reasonableness of the claim and of
the possible counterclaims, given the concrete situations in which they arise.
This analogy would seem to support the right of the miner to capture and,
in physically occupying ocean space, reasonably interfere with other lawful
uses of the high seas. Fishing as an analogy would appear, however, to be
deficient in one very important particular. While it may provide a legal
parallel to the right of capture of nodules it says nothing to the more diffi-
cult set of issues connected with the miners' felt economic and technological
need for exclusive rights to mine a tract of reasonable size, unless the rather
glancing references to occupation and prescription in the contexts of seden-
tary and other historic fisheries are intended to fill this need. In this
reviewer's opinion, the drawing of an analogy between deep seabed mining
and fisheries in the book under review does not achieve this second goal;
but it may not have been intended to do so.
"
2P. 1. The author, however, notes the legal pitfalls existing in such an approach. See,
especially, pp. 176-201.
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This reviewer would like to add a further caution to Kronmiller's use of
fisheries in support of the lawfulness of deep seabed mining. True it is that
both claim a common protection and validation of title to captured
resources under the doctrine of the freedom of the seas. But, fisheries
treated as a legal analogue to deep seabed mining may, under certain con-
ditions at least prove a "false friend" (also known as a "tricky twin" or a
"slovenly twin") to adopt a parallel from the study of languages.' 13
The present international customary law regime of high seas fisheries
came into being some three and a half centuries ago under very different
technological and economic conditions from those which now prevail. It
came into being, moreover, under the prevailing political pressures and
philosophical theories germane to the evolution of modern Western
Europe, especially those deriving from the Anglo-Dutch rivalries over the
North Sea fishery, and English and Dutch denials of Spanish and Portu-
guese pretensions. It also derived from the then prevailing theories of natu-
ral law, of the relation of Man and Nature and of the conditions necessary
for the creation of property rights. In the early and middle years of the
seventeenth century, fishing technology and investment had not reached a
level whereby the "free rider" had become such a problem that the possibil-
ity of his reaping the benefits of the discovery of a fish stock would render
the discover's investment in the search and exploration valueless. By con-
trast, this is, today, the major fear of investors in deep seabed hard mineral
mining.
Because, at the present stage of the development of the industry, when
many ocean-going fishing fleets have a large and sophisticated investment
in the discovery of fish stocks (by means of spotter planes, sonar, radar and
radio), one might argue that, if the world's ocean fishing fraternity had the
opportunity of doing the doctrine of the freedom of the seas over, it might
well argue for at least some degree of a discoverer's exclusive right to
exploit a newly discovered fish stock. It is, clearly, the legal privileges that
the present-day customary international law of fisheries gives to free riders
that make high seas fisheries a "false friend" of deep seabed mining.
2. LAYING AND MAINTAINING SUBMARINE
CABLES AND PIPELINES
Kronmiller perceives, and in this reviewer's opinion, perceived correctly,
important analogies between seabed mining and cable and pipeline laying
and upkeep.
Here too, however, as in fishing, there are important differences. Cables
and pipelines involve a permanent (or semipermanent) but not necessarily
exclusive physical occupation of an area of the seabed. In some cases the
water column, too, may be preempted for a considerable period. On the
other hand, cables and pipelines may overlay each other, and other uses of
"
3 See, e.g., CONCISE OXFORD FRENCH DICTIONARY at ix (1956).
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the sea may, and do, take place nearby. Again, the laying and maintenance
of cables and pipelines has no need to find any marketable title to a product
in the physical fact of the capture of the item processed or sold-this last
being a common feature of fishing on the high seas and mining under them.
Be these differences as they may, the functional similarities of cable and
pipeline laying and maintenance with deep seabed mining, and the reliance
of both upon the freedom of the seas as assuring the privilege and protect-
ing its exercise from unjustifiable interference, testify strong similarities
between the two activities. Furthermore, the traditional acceptance of cable
laying gives impressive support to the author's claim that deep seabed min-
ing, despite its nascency, should receive a favorable reception.
3. MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
Starting with the premise that, clearly, marine scientific research is a
traditional exercise of the freedom of the high seas and is lawful, Kronmil-
ler argues for the lawfulness of seabed mining on the basis of perceived
similarities between these two activities. These he finds in the following
operational analogies: (1) research ships often navigate like mining vessels;
and (2) they frequently launch equipment into the depths of the ocean,
including locations in and through the deep seabed muds. In addition the
writer observes that the environmental impacts of the two activities are not
dissimilar. He writes: "[i]nherently, scientific research vessels discharge no
fewer pollutants incident to normal navigation than do seabed mining ves-
sels."' 14 Finally, the parallelism of this traditional exercise of the freedom
of the high seas and seabed mining lies in the facts that neither entails a de
facto or de jure closure of the high seas, nor occasion great harm to the
living resources of the ocean; unlike certain other permitted uses of the
ocean under customary law-he gives nuclear testing as an example." 5
Kronmiller concludes this section of his presentation with the observation
that:
It cannot reasonably be maintained that marine scientific research is a lawful use
of the seas, in principle, but that deep seabed mining is not. Moreover, as is the
case in law with respect to such research, the lawfulness of deep seabed mining
could be called into question if closures of large ocean areas to foreign use or




"'This is the example Kronmiller gives, see p. 499. This reviewer feels that certain other
uses, for example, the massive fishing operations on the high seas by the fleets of certain states
which tend to destroy stocks completely and are often designated "mining", and yet fall within
the traditional freedom of the high seas to fish, might have been a more felicitous choice for an
example of the author's quite valid and apposite analogy drawn from nuclear weapons testing
on the free high seas. This reviewer believes that nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere,
under customary international law and apart from the Test Ban Treaty, is now in a twilight
zone of permissibility and is limited by the rule of reasonableness.
116p. 500.
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4. USE OF THE SEABED FOR CERTAIN
MILITARY PURPOSES
Kronmiller cites the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed
and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, 117 which is now in force, 118 as
testifying, through its negotiating history and the felt need for its existence,
to an exercise of the freedom of the seas which would be lawful but for that
treaty's binding character. He also points to the fact that attempts by a
number of states to effect a total ban on military uses of the seabed were
defeated in the negotiations for this Treaty. He argues that this confirms an
implication that, without the convention regime, the placement of the pro-
hibited weapons would be permissible under the doctrine of the freedom of
the high seas."l 9 The need for the Treaty also creates a further implication
in Kronmiller's view. He argues, consistently with the United States posi-
tion, that military uses of the bed of the high seas which are not within the
Treaty's prohibitions (for example, the emplacement of submarine detec-
tion systems on the seabed) remain permissible under the freedom of the
high seas. Kronmiller would appear to present this exercise of the freedom
of the high seas, and those which follow, as being permitted under custom-
ary international law, but as less "reasonable" or more likely, in terms of
the facts, to constitute "unjustifiable interferences" with other uses than the,
comparatively speaking, harmless and less preemptive exercise of the free-
dom of the high seas.
5. OCEAN DUMPING, INCLUDING THE DISPOSAL OF
RADIOACTIVE WASTES
Communities have consistently and traditionally used the sea as a sink.
So to abuse and pollute ocean waters would seem to be a time-honored
exercise of the freedom of the seas. Accordingly, Kronmiller observes that
the present majority ". . . view is clearly that the disposal of wastes by
dumping is a lawful use of the high seas, subject only to treaty obligations
not reflecting customary law."'120 The author tells us that he selected the
disposal of radioactive waste as an analogy justifying the mining of the sea-
"'Done at Washington, London and Moscow, 11 February 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S.
No. 7337.
"..As of January 1, 1979, 64 states had ratified the treaty which had come into force on
May 18, 1972. Treaties in Force 331 (1979).
'P. 502. Kronmiller also points to important parties' understandings in this regard in the
statements of the President of the United States and of the representatives of the United King-
dom and the United States at the signing ceremony in Washington. See Treaty Banning
Emplacement ofNuclear Weapons on the Seabed Signed by 62 Nations in Washington, 64 DEP'T
OF STATE BULL. 288 (1971).
2
'P. 503. At note 956, id., Kronmiller reminds us that a Czechoslovakian proposal at the
1958 Conference to ban disposal of wastes was defeated. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C.2/L.
118 (1958). The Conference did pass the following resolution:
POLLUTION OF THE HIGH SEAS
BY RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
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bed of the high seas because of its environmentally harmful and its preemp-
tive character as far as other uses go, through the possibility of the leakage
of toxic wastes. Clearly, the toxic wastes so disposed of involve something
more closely approaching an "unjustifiable interference" with other legiti-
mate uses of the high seas, let alone their seabed, than does ocean mining.
6. GUNNERY AND BOMBING PRACTICE
Kronmiller argues that gunnery and bombing practice, long range missile
testing and large scale naval exercises on the high seas have long been
regarded as lawful, "when carried out with reasonable regard to other
ocean activities."'121 Hence, so he argues, "if such hazardous uses of the sea
involving defacto though not defjure, exclusively over wide areas are law-
ful, the permissibility of deep seabed mining cannot be reasonably dis-
puted."1 22
7. ARTIFICIAL INSTALLATIONS
The preemptive character of these structures which "often involve inter-
ference with other ocean activities" is noted and an argument on the basis
of the comparative utilities or disutilities of the activity stated to be lawful,
vis-A-vis deep seabed mining is employed, as in the preceding examples, to
justify deep seabed mining in terms of the latter's less preemptive character.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS REGARDING THE
SELECTED ANALOGIES
The logic of Kronmiller's position in citing examples of uses of the high
seas which have qualities of temporarily preempting, for greater or lesser
Resolution Adopted on the Report of the Second Committee, relating to
Article 25 ofthe Convention on the High Seas
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Recognizing the need for international action in the field of disposal of radioactive wastes in
the sea,
Taking into account action which has been proposed by various national and international
bodies and studies which have been published on the subject,
Noting that the International Commission on Radiological Protection has made recommen-
dations regarding the maximum permissible concentration of radioisotopes in the human
body and the maximum permissible concentration in the air and water,
Recommends that the International Atomic Energy Agency, in consultation with existing
groups and established organs having acknowledged competence in the field of radiological
protection, should pursue whatever studies and take whatever action is necessary to assist
States in controlling the discharge or release of radioactive materials to the sea, in promul-
gating standards, and in drawing up internationally acceptable regulations to prevent pollu-
tion of the sea by radioactive materials in amounts which would adversely affect man and
his marine resources.
10th Plenary Meeting, 23Apr1 1958
2 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, PLENARY MEETINGS AT 143-44,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 56 (1958).2 1P. 506.
122jd
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periods of time, high seas areas would appear to be that of arguing by
example. He also validly demonstrates that the list of permitted maritime
activities based on the freedom of the high seas is not, in general, closed.
This formulation does, however, leave the sympathetic reader with a nag-
ging doubt as to the conclusiveness of the argument that the open list of
such freedoms, therefore, includes, of necessity, deep seabed mining.
Indeed, a comment on Kronmiller's presentation is that he does not clearly
formulate what is, surely, his thesis, namely that the freedom of the high
seas is a comprehensive premise for all lawful exercises, namely all those
which are not prohibited by custom or treaty, 23 or which do not "unjustifi-
ably interfere"' 124 with other uses. The specific lawful uses he draws upon
are then not independent liberties each having precise boundaries strictly
limited by the permitted activity and contained in an open-ended list. They
are simply selected denotative examples of the general freedom. Unfortu-
nately, Kronmiller, in stressing the reasoning by analogy approach, and by
not at least equally stressing the parallel and/or alternative deductive form
of argument, leaves this reviewer with a sense that his argument could have
been more persuasive by stressing the global and general view of the free-
dom of the seas as the premise of all activities which are neither expressly
prohibited nor constitute unjustifiable interferences with other uses.
IV. A Collateral Issue
Now that President Carter has signed the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals
Resources Act' 25 into law, and that the German Federal Parliament has
now enacted a similar statute, Kronmiller's discussion of the lawfulness, in
public international law, of such legislation takes on a new and central
importance.
Despite the author's significant professional role in the drafting, passage
through Congress, and signing of the Act, the discussion of this topic
appears almost as a postscript. This, one may presume, may be owing to
the fact that, when the book was written, domestic legislative solutions by
interested states were at a relatively uncertain stage of development, and
the very fact that he was participating in the process may well have caused
Kronmi~ler to feel that to say more could have risked prejudicing the out-
come of the legislative effort to which he was, personally and professionally,
committed.
Starting with the premise that a state may legislate to bind its own citi-
'See, e.g., The S.S. Lotus [19271 P.C.I.J., ser. A,. No. 10, WORLD COURT REPORTS 20 (M.
Hudson ed. 1935).
"'An alternative use of "unjustifiable interference" either as a negation of a privilege or as
its affirmation subject to an obligation to compensate for all harms attributed to its lawful
exercise, see, infra, § IV.C. and especially the textual material and discussion accompanying
note 141.
12530 U.S.C. 1401, 94 Stat. 553 (1980).
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zens to a "site-specific"' 26 deep seabed mining statute, Kronmiller observes
that a mutual regime could be established by the reciprocal domestic legis-
lation of a number of states which, under reciprocal grants of jurisdiction
over each others' citizens, could create a regime for the safeguarding of
deep-ocean seabed mine sites without reference to the development of gen-
eral international law concepts of protection. While it may be agreed that,
among the states participating in such a reciprocal regime, a legal shield
could be assured against free riders who are the citizens or enterprises of
those participating states, such a regime is unable to guarantee protection
against other free riders haling from third states. Such a theory would
merely, therefore, enable free riders to engage in corporate registrations in
such nonparticipating countries and in registering their mining ships under
flags of convenience-the conveniences in question being those provided by
any, and every, state which dextrously stays out of any reciprocal regime
which is formed. For such a regime would necessarily be special to the
participating states only. It could not, without universal adhesion, become
a general regime binding all states. Thus the weakness of the blueprint in
the book under review is that of the circuity of most, if not all, bootstrap
operations. Furthermore, any regime predicated on the thesis it propounds
would ensure its own defeat by leaving third states free, under general
international law, to license deep seabed miners to amble freely into the
unprotected (but thoroughly researched and surveyed) preserves of miners
coming from states participating in the special regime. The free riders need
only establish their privilege by wearing the colors of some nonparticipating
state and so scoop the benefits of the first miner's labors. A more general
regime, capable of a better protection of investment in expensive surveys
and site-specific technological development is needed if this new legislation
is to be economically, as well as legally, effective. Indeed one of the basic
themes of this review is to stress the need to argue for a substantive rule
under customary international law protecting equitably sized and adminis-
tered mining tracts, and thus to justify domestic legislation as a regulation
of citizens enjoying the customary liberties given under the general freedom
of the high seas.
Until a more cogent legal pediment for establishing the validity of seabed
mining legislation is offered, this reviewer would like, with all modesty, to
propose his own theory of the reception of the doctrine of an exclusive usu-
fruct in equitably sized mining tracts by international law, historically justi-
fied by virtue of the "Spitzbergen Analogy," and analytically legitimated by
virtue of the widespread acceptance in the mining laws of many countries
of the practice of miners' rights. It thus constitutes a valid and effective
principle of international law by virtue of both custom and Article 38.1(c)
26Kronmiller, at p. 508, defines "site-specific" as follows:
[Elach operation for technical reasons is, and must be, tailored to a single site. Moreover, a
condition of economic viability is the assurance that the operator will be able to exhaust his
mine site without interference by a competing operator.
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of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (i.e., the source of inter-
national law, or rubric, denominated "the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations").127
V. Conclusion
Full agreement between a reviewer and the author of the book under
review is most unusual-to say the least. Be that as it may, in general this
reviewer does agree with the book's purpose and its evaluation of both the
customary international law of deep seabed mining beyond the jurisdiction
of coastal states and the contemporary conditions necessary for demonstrat-
ing legal change, apart from the multilateral conventions, to customary
international law brought about by expressions of states' opinions and
intentions in international organizations. On the other hand, there are
points of disagreement which will be adumbrated in the following
paragraphs.
A. The Problem of Exclusive Mining Tracts
This reviewer feels that the book fell short, in a few segments, of its
promise in that the author was perhaps overly hesitant with regard to some
topics-for example, the free rider problem. This was equally true of his
approach to the question of generally accepted norms regarding original
ownership through possession, and the development of a thesis for demon-
strating the existence, here and now, of the international legal pediment of
the mining tracts which can be allocated under the Deep Seabed Hard Min-
erals Mining Act, 1980. In this regard, it is suggested, a chain of reasoning
framed broadly on similar lines to this reviewer's miners' rights thesis,
which is based on the Spitzbergen Analogy, the common practice of pioneer
mining communities, and widespread legislation incorporating this
approach, might well have provided an adequate premise for amplifying
Kronmiller's theme in terms of "general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations" (Article 38.1 .c. of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice). Alternatively, perhaps, the deployment and demonstration of an
alternative theory which might, possibly, have been based on "the equity of
the thing," whereby seabed miners could be shown as entitled to take rea-
sonably sized deep seabed mining tracts, 128 would have, in this reviewer's
eyes at least, rounded out and completed the book's purpose. Furthermore,
'
27See Goldie, A General International Law Doctrinefor Seabed Regimes, 7 INT'L LAW. 796,
804-12 (1973), and Mining Rights and the General International Law Regime ofthe Deep Ocean
Floor, 2 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1, 6-32 (1975). For a recent United States domestic law (Admi-
ralty) case taking a similar view of the acquisition of possessory rights to that advanced here,
see Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d
560 (5th Cir. 1981). In this case the appellate court affirmed an injunction prohibiting "free
rider" defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs operation, and from removing treasure
from an abandoned wrecked ship found by the plaintiff and being actively exploited by him.
28See, supra, note 106 & accompanying text.
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an argument (in addition to those usually referred to under the rubric of
"miners' rights"), and developing from the Spitzbergen Analogy, could
have been deployed to answer the critics of the use of that analogy and who
argue that property rights cannot exist without a sovereign. 129 Such an
argument could have been framed, in some such terms as the following:
As one who sides with President (and later Chief Justice) Taft, 130 I feel the
opposing view is simply an unquestioning acceptance of a positivistic theory of
law. 13 1 It is true that in the freshman property books we tend to be told that
"property" is something that the law of the state says is "property"-rather like
Humpty Dumpty's famous speech in A/ice Through the Looking Glass.13 2 Other
"'See, e.g., Burton, Freedom of the Seas. International Law Applicable to Deep Seabed Min-
ing Claims, 29 STANFORD L. REV. 1135, 1145-47, 1156-59 (1977). This reviewer is preparing a
response to the criticisms of the "Spitzbergen Analogy" in this and other commentaries.
'
30Who said to the United States Congress in 1909, regarding a Norwegian proposal for a
conference to settle the future of Spitzbergen (then a terra nullius), that the United States had
no interest in establishing any territorial claims on Spitzbergen, but expressed the determina-
tion to attend the conference so as to protect rights "already vested" of American citizens to
mining tracts in the area. He did this in a State of the Union Address to Congress in 1909
where he also said:
The Department of State, in view of proofs filed with it in 1906, showing American posses-
sion, occupation and working of certain coal-bearing lands in Spitzbergen, accepted the
invitation under the reservation above stated [ie., the question of altering the status of the
islands as countries belonging to no particular state and as equally open to the citizens and
subjects of all states should not be raised] and under the further reservation that all interests
in those islands already vested should be protected and that there should be equality of
opportunity for the future.
Annual Message of the President to Congress, Dec. 7, 1909 (1909) For. Rels, U.S. IX, at cxiii
(1914 ed.).
"'For a general definition of legal positivism as a theory for determining questions of the
validity of rights, see DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 17 (1978). For an application of
this theory to the question of rights on Spitzbergen while that archipelago remained a terra
nullius see the following comment by Lansing:
In these circumstances a real right, in the common acceptance of the term, cannot exist in
Spitzbergen. Restriction upon the use and occupancy of land [there] must depend not on the
government's having control over the land used or occupied, but upon control over the per-
sons who might freely occupy and use it if not restrained in their acts. The result of control
in both cases would be almost, if not quite, identical, although the exercise of control would
arise from principles entirely different. The essential feature of ownership is the exclusion of
all others from the use and enjoyment of the thing owned. This is equally true of personal
and real property. Ownership in the case of land in Spitzbergen could not, therefore exist.
All persons cannot be excluded. Only those persons could be excluded whose governments
have conferred upon the insular government to the right to exclude them. Exclusive use and
occupancy is lacking, and so land in Spitzbergen cannot, in the true sense, be owned.
If, however, the governments of the world should with substantial unanimity agree that
their respective nationals might by direction of the government formed by them for Spitz-
bergen as their common agent be excluded from the occupancy and use of land unless spe-
cially privileged to do so, the effect could be similar to that resulting from ownership,
although it would lack the permanency of the right based on territorial sovereignty, for it
would be liable to the invasion of nationals of a Power which had not conferred any portion
of its political sovereignty upon the government established. In the case of ownership, the
right of exclusion is complete and is derived from exclusive control of the land; in the case of
the right acquired in Spitzbergen, the right of exclusion would be incomplete and would be
derived from the delegated power to control persons of certain nationalities who might
otherwise enter upon the land.
Lansing, A Unique International Problem, I I AM. J. INT'L L. 763, at 769 (1917).
'
32CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (1871).
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writers have taken other views. Such views are not only reflected in President
Taft's State of the Union Address, 133 but also in the Treaty of Paris of 1919 in
which the signatory powers recognized Norwegian sovereignty over the Archipel-
ago, but preserved all rights which had been "acquired" while the islands were
without a sovereign. Again, an alternative view of property was reflected in the
writings of John Locke who wrote in the late seventeenth century.1 34 [His views
were] very much like a modern economic theory regarding property. For exam-
ple, Professor Demsetz tells us that when a resource becomes scarce, sufficiently
scarce to require the internalization of externalities, there is motivation for view-
ing it as property and thus excluding others, usually by some kind of implicit or
explicit arrangement. 135 Locke and Demsetz are not very far apart. But their
language games are very different from that of the followers of John Austin and
the nineteenth-century positivists. 1
36
In a similar vein the practical men who established and bought and sold,
and made money out of, their mining tracts on Spitzbergen took a different
view of their rights from that of legal positivists who dogmatically insisted
that rights to own and dispose of property can only exist where a sovereign
is present to confer them. The miners of Spitzbergen, in asserting their own
claims and reciprocally their neighbors', were guided by the utility of inter-
'
33See note 128 supra.
' Earlier than Austin, John Locke (whose views helped frame the ideas of the American
Revolution) took the view that property rights antedated.the state and resulted from the com-
bination of "nature" and "labor." He wrote, in his Second Treatise of Civil Government:
Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian's who hath killed it. . . And amongst
those who are counted the civilized part of mankind who have made and multiplied positive
laws to determine property, this original law of Nature, for the beginning of property in
what was before common, still takes place, and by virtue thereof what fish any one catches
in the ocean, that great and still remaining common of mankind; or what ambergris any one
takes up there, is, by the labor that removes it out of that common state Nature left it in,
made his property who takes that pain about it.
LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT at 30, reprinted in LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 135-36 (1956).
13'An economist, Harold Demsetz, has offered a view of property differing from both Lan-
sing's and Locke's. He writes:
A primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater inter-
nalization of externalities. One condition is necessary to make costs and benefits externali-
ties. The cost of a transaction in the rights between the parties (internalization) must exceed
the gains from internalization. In general, transacting cost can be large relative to gains
because of "natural" difficulties in trading or they can be largely because of legal reasons.
In a lawful society the prohibition of voluntary negotiations makes the cost of transacting
infinite. Some costs and benefits are not taken into account by users of resources whenever
externalities exist, but allowing transactions increases the degree to which internalization
takes place.
Demsetz, Towards a Theory o/Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 at 348 (1967).
'
36The question of determining the existence of property rights depends on the definition of
property, and of the legal order establishing that definition, a language game. If a person
stipulates an Austinian definition of property he will deny the existence of property outside the
existence of the Austinian order--the sovereign state as the premise of laws. But the conclu-
sion is tautologous: it is inherent in the premise if he accepts some other definition, for exam-
ple, that of Demsetz, the sovereign state may not be essential. What Demsetz perceives as
necessary is a social (political? contractual?) arrangement whereby property rights can arise
"when it becomes economic for those affected by externalities to internalize benefits and
costs." Id. at 354. These can arise in a societal organization that knows no sovereign common
to all the participants.
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nalizing the externalities of taking coal from equitably and economically
sized tracts. Accordingly, before 1920 they established a regime whose
basic agreement ("social contract") may be summarized as follows:
"This is my tract because I am working it."
"That is your tract because everybody is working theirs the way you and
I are working our separate tracts."
"That other has no tract, he is stealing."
"If he operates outside the regime then our governments will speak to
his."
"If our governments refuse to speak, or if his neglects the representations
of our governments, will the game be at an end?"
"That is a matter of choice, every legal order can be put to an end by
agreement or be violently overthrown."'1
37
The power of a legal order to enforce or protect rights may be a social
necessity, but it is not a legal or logical necessity. The legal order itself is,
after all, the arrangement whereby rights can be created or distributed. The
question of enforcement is simply not one of validity, but one of effective-
ness.138
To this reviewer's mind Kronmiller sought to find his justification, not on
a principled premise such as that indicated, or some other pediment upon
which a theory, not only of a right to own manganese nodules actually
taken from the seabed and reduced to possession, but also of the right to
mine, exclusively, a reasonably sized tract, can be grounded. Instead, he
reasons from analogies which may, in themselves, appear cogent, but which
fail to affirm, positively the logical justification, and the justice, of mining
manganese nodules on the deep ocean floor as constituting a denotative
application of the general freedom of the high seas. Nor did he argue both
the legality and notice of establishing rights to exclusive mining tracts.
B. The United States' Negotiating Posture and
Its Juridical Consequences
A discussion of the political and economic framework, especially those
parts of it which involve the interactions of the Group of 77 and the Soviet
bloc on the one hand, and the "Western and Other" geographical group on
the other, might well have invited some discussion of theory of negotiation,
for example, that of Professor Roger Fisher's theory of the "Yessable Prop-
371t should be clear that the participants in the Spitzbergen mining activities did much more
than play a language game peculiar and limited only to that archipelago prior to the Treaty of
Paris's signature in 1920. They provided an example. Moreover, that had, and still has, suffi-
cient economic validity and utility in terms of the internalization of externalities, and had a
normative content, to constitute a precedent which is available for articulating a regime gov-
erning deep seabed mining for the present day-subject only to contradictory developments in
customary international law.
"
3 Goldie, Customary International Law and Deep Seabed Mining, Symposium Mining the
Deep Seabed A Range ofPerspectives, 6 SYRACUSE J. OF INT'L L. & COM. 173, 177-79 (1979).
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osition."' 139 Can such a proposition be found which could satisfy all sides?
A brief outline of that sort of discussion now can be put forward. (By a
"yessable proposition"-which he did not clearly define-Professor Fisher
would appear to have meant a concrete proposal which would at least mini-
mally satisfy the offeror while inducing his opponent to abandon his oppo-
sition and accept the offer.)
Indeed, an analysis of the history of the United States Draft for a United
Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area (Aug. 3, 1970)140 illus-
trates some of the difficulties involved with the Fisher Prescription. In that
draft document the United States, in effect, made an offer which, at the
time, was thought, by its sponsors, to be highly "yessable" by the Group of
77. No doubt, had the American diplomacy been different, it might well
have been "yessed." But, since the package then put forward was seen by
the Soviet bloc and the Group of 77 merely as America's "first bid," it was
given a barely polite reception. It was seen as inviting forceful or "claim-
ing" tactics (in the boxers' parlance). So now, sadly, that well meaning
draft is a dead letter.
14 1
The result of the mode of the presentation, and the advocacy, of this
generous, honest, and potentially effective document has had a further dele-
terious result. In the negotiations at the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea, the United States has been forced into a defensive,
even a self-justificatory, if not self-deprecatory, posture ever since its draft
was first unveiled, as if that offer were a dishonest claim to preempt the
world's resources on behalf only of its own nationals, rather than a proposal
for an organization which was intended to develop a sharing of wealth, an
organ of international cooperation, a considerable augmentation of devel-
opmental aid and a needed enhancement of the revenues of the United
Nations, at the expense of diminishing the economic advantages of its own
nationals and enterprises. Indeed the fate of this testimony of American
goodwill poignantly and concretely illustrates Dr. Herman Kahn's criticism
of Professor Fisher's book, where the former said, in part:
In those situations in which there is not sufficient mutual interest to strike an
acceptable bargain, the net thrust of Mr. Fisher's insights is likely to give exces-
sive and rather effective ammunition to those urging concession and compromise.
That is, in many ways Mr. Fisher's recommendations can be used to generate
psychological pressures, arguments, and even misleadingly seductive and seem-
ingly neutral observations that are actually recommendations for making conces-
sions and compromises-or even more important, creating the conditions for
such concession and compromise. For this reason politicians, the humanists, ide-
alists, utopians and the amateur citizens are going to find this book more sweep-
t
39FISHER, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT FOR BEGINNERS (1969). Chapter II is entitled "Give
Them a Yesable Proposition."
'49 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1046 (1970) [hereinafter cited as the United States Draft].
4
'For Cassandra-like forebodings in this regard, see Goldie, The United States Draft for a
United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area-A "Polite Conversation, " Pro-
ceedings on the American Society of International Law at Its Sixty-Ffth Annual Meeting, 65
AM. J. INT'L L. 123 (1971).
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ingly persuasive than many of the ideologically committed or even some of the
relatively hard-headed and tough-minded (in the William James sense) bargain-
ers. 142
In following up this perceptive comment, it may be observed, the exper-
iences of the Western and Other Group in the Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea can be represented by a development from
the sketch on the dust jacket of Fisher's book. He shows two fencers, one in
the lunge, the other in the en garde, posture. The former's attention is
deflected by a carrot on the latter's rapier. (The yessable proposition?) But
what if our lunging duellist remembers elementary economics lessons about
"satisfaction deferred"? If he does not allow himself to be tempted or
deflected by one carrot, how many more may be the reward of aggressive (if
un-prep school) behavior?143 In fact, the Fisher Prescription has provided a
way of losing, not gaining, diplomatic goals, by heightening expectations
and placing a premium, in fact, although not in intention, on encouraging
those who claim to try "upping the ante." The "yessable proposition" can
thus be seen as creating dilemmas for the original offeror. It has also pro-
vided a potent means of straining international friendships, through misun-
derstandings and the making of future claims, as the Law of the Sea
negotiations also testify. A discussion in Kronmiller's book of the postures,
tactics, and interaction of claims in terms of some such theory as Professor
Fisher's, and of its weaknesses, may well have helped to lay bare, and help
resolve, some of the more intractable problems of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, and especially those of Committee I
(Deep Seabed Mining).
C. Property and Liability, the Question of
"Unjustifiable Interference"
Another topic which would have merited discussion is that of "unjustifi-
able interference," not merely in terms of validating property rights, but
also of liability and social responsibility. Some activities are still permissi-
ble, even if possibly, or potentially, harmful. Those who engage in them are
called upon to bear the cost of any losses which may eventuate from their
operations. This reviewer feels that an examination of the relevant princi-
ples of strict liability would have helped to strengthen the argument for the
lawfulness of deep seabed mining by meeting arguments that have been
made in terms of liability in general and environmental impacts in particu-
lar. If some mythical ("Luddite"?) status quo is not to be retained at all
'42FISHER, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT FOR BEGINNERS (1969), reviewed, H. Kahn, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 9, 1969, § 7 (book reviews) at 72-73.
"'In large part it was the expectations that the diplomatic scenario for the presentation of
the United States Draft that led to this reviewer's skepticism back in 1971. See Goldie, The
United States Draft for a United Nation's Convention on the International Seabed Area-A
Polite Conversation, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. (Proceedings of the Seventy-Fifth Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law) 123-33 (1971).
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costs, then preventing the development of an industry would merely be
counterproductive. But, were it permitted to operate and possibly cause
harm, it could thereupon be called strictly to account to pay, in terms of
absolute liability, for any injuries it occasioned by its operations. This is,
after all, an accepted principle of domestic law, and has been clearly enun-
ciated in the following passage by Professor John G. Fleming.
On its most prosaic level the problem may be illustrated by an oil-drilling inci-
dent in which the operator decided to "blow-out" a well and proceeded to do so
in accordance with established procedures. These, however, were in no way
proof against unknown and harmful substances being belched from the bowels of
the earth, including the arsenic that was spewed over neighbouring pastures.
Here the operator had resolved the invidious choice facing him by subordinating
the interests of others to his own. The chances of something deleterious coming
up might have been comparatively small though clearly recognized, and the more
perplexing because they were irreducible by anything short of not proceeding
with the blow-out. Yet the latter was a necessary and accustomed procedure in
oil drilling-an industry of paramount economic importance which it would not
be justifiable to impede for less than absolutely compelling reasons. To say that
the operator's choice was negligent would imply that for him to proceed would be
unlawful and could be enjoined by injunction. It is precisely to resolve this
dilemma that the law may say to him: "What you propose to do is not prohibited
and we therefore cannot stop you. Yet if you proceed, you must be prepared to
foot the bill should anything go wrong, as you hope it will not though well aware
that it might.'"
When the production of a mineral or material enhances world welfare by
preventing prices from spiralling through monopolistic and cartel practices,
should not similar policies inform the development of international values
and law to those indicated by Professor Fleming as existing in the Anglo-
American common law? Some such line of argument, this reviewer respect-
fully suggests, may well have been worth pursuing.
D. Epilogue
The immediately preceding paragraphs of this review may seem rather
ungenerous, possibly even outside the canons of reviewmanship, in that
they are not so much concerned with the book that has been written as that
which the reviewer would, obviously, have liked to have seen written. To
make some amends for that apparent unfairness, he now closes with the
thought that, if King Neptune, or the world's consumers of increasingly
potentially scarce minerals, or their producers (other than those who are
counting upon present politics to create future scarcities and hence future
opportunities for cartelization) were to give a prestigious prize for the best
book written on the international legal and institutional problems of deep
seabed mining, this reviewer would urge, as strenuously as he is able, the
outstanding worthiness of such an award to the meritorious integrity and
the honest scholarship of Theodore Kronmilier's book.
'"FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 158-59 (1967).

